

INTRODUCTION

Since the armistice the text of this monograph has been submitted to James A. Field, London representative of the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, to whom we are indebted for additional facts, especially in relation to the important organizations associated with the Supreme War Council. Material for a more detailed study of all these organizations has been assembled with a view to publication in a subsequent issue.

This account of the Supreme War Council has a double claim on public attention, because it is the first available description of a great international organization which has already played a large part in securing victory, and because it seems destined in some measure to serve as the groundwork for the superstructure of a League of Nations. For, as stated by the author of the accompanying notes: "There are not a few to-day who believe that the surest foundation of a real and workable League of Nations is to be found in the joint international administration of economic affairs, in which the war has helped us to recognize a common international interest." This belief applies less to the Supreme War Council itself than to the organizations subordinate to it.

For it must be borne in mind that the Supreme War Council is a political body whose members are primarily the executive heads of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States. This accounts for the prominence given to the speeches of Lloyd George in the text; because they happened to be the only direct word available from it. Such statements are to be viewed as sources of information. Political exigencies constantly weigh with the Supreme War Council, and its announcements of policy have been affected thereby.

The reader will therefore appreciate that the same freedom of development is not possible for the Supreme War Council as for

the organizations concurrently resulting from the Interallied Conference at Versailles in December, 1917, and which were officially listed on September 15, 1918, as follows:

- I. ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL, with associated or subordinate bodies as follows:
 - a. The Food Council, consisting of the four food controllers, developed in the summer of 1918 in connection with the Program Policy Committee of the Transport Council. The ordinary executive powers of this council are exercised by the Committee of Representatives¹ sitting in London and co-ordinating the work of the Wheat Executive, the Meats and Fats Executive, the Oils and Seeds Executive, and an unnamed body dealing with sugar. Two New York organizations, the Wheat Export Company and the Allied Provisions Export Commission, are subordinate to the Wheat and Meats Executive exclusively. There is an Interallied Sugar Committee at Washington.
 - b. The Munitions Council at Paris, developed in the summer of 1918 in connection with the Program Policy Committee of the Transport Council, with subordinate committees as follows: Technical Munitions Committee; Steel Committee; Nonferrous Metal Committee; Explosives Committee; Aircraft Committee; Nitrates Executive; Chemical Committee; and the Interallied Transportation Committee in Liaison.
 - c. Program Committees, at present directly responsible to the Transport Council, and dealing with raw materials as follows: Wool Committee; Cotton Committee; Jute, Flax and Hemp Committee; Hides, Leather and Tanning Materials Committee; Paper and Paper-making Material Committee; Timber Committee; Tobacco and Matches Committee.
 - d. The Petroleum Conference; and the incipient Coal and Coke Committee.

¹The Committee of Food Representatives is the permanent executive organization of the Food Council and bears to the Food Council substantially the same relation which the Allied Maritime Transport Executive bears to the Maritime Transport Council, and which the Board of Military Representatives bears to the Supreme War Council.

2. **INTERALLIED COUNCIL ON WAR PURCHASES AND FINANCE** deals with international exchange purchases in America for allied account. It has come to exercise an important influence on allied purchases in other parts of the world. It is closely in touch with the British Treasury and is ordinarily appealed to by any of the other interallied bodies which become conscious of difficulties of finance. The council owed its creation and development largely to Oscar T. Crosby, formerly assistant secretary of the Treasury, who accompanied Colonel House to the Interallied Conference.
3. **COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE RAVITAILLEMENT**, an organization of diminishing importance, arranging supply and incidental finance for France, Italy and the small Allies.
4. **ALLIED BLOCKADE COMMITTEE**, concerned with control of exports to northern neutrals, has absorbed the Contraband Committee. The committee was evolved from earlier devices for controlling exports to the northern neutrals of Europe. It has become an administrative committee which sits daily in London and dispatches large amounts of detailed business. It is connected with our Government through the London representative of the War Trade Board and with the British Government, primarily through the British Ministry of Blockade.

The Allied Rationing and Statistical Committee is a sub-committee.
5. **INTERALLIED SCIENTIFIC FOOD COMMISSION**, with two members from the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the United States and one from Belgium, investigates dietaries and nutrition in relation to food programs.
6. **INTERALLIED CHARTERING EXECUTIVE** manages chartering of neutral vessels for European Allies.
7. **COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM.**

In addition to the above, there are:

1. **BOARD OF MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES**, organized as a result of the Rapallo agreement of November, 1917, whose individual "function is to act as technical" advisers to the Supreme War Council. They "receive from the Government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war" and "watch day by day the situation of the forces and the means of all kinds of which the allied armies and the enemy armies dispose." France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States made up the board.
2. **ALLIED NAVAL CONFERENCE** is a body analogous to the Board of Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council; that is to say, it is a technical body, responsible, of course, to the Supreme War Council, so far as ultimate military policies are concerned. It meets at frequent intervals in London or Paris, on which occasions high officers of the allied navies attend.

ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL

Of the nine major institutions in this list the Allied Maritime Transport Council is of the most far-reaching importance and significance. The following authentic statement respecting it is consequently printed in this place:

The Allied Maritime Transport Council was organized in London in March, 1918, in accordance with the decision of the Interallied Conference which had been held at Versailles the preceding December. The council was created as an interallied organization to investigate the resources of merchant shipping available to the Allies, to consider the demands of the Allies upon this shipping and to recommend to the Governments associated in the council a concerted shipping policy for the effective conduct of the war. The Transport Council is thus essentially an advisory body. It is without final executive power: it makes recommendations to the executives of the respective Governments or to the Supreme War Council.

The council is not concerned directly with the actual operation of ships. It deals with general shipping policy. This distinction is important, for it has been misunderstood. Ship owners or others who object to governmental control of shipping have contended that ships are operated much less efficiently under government direction than when they are left in the practiced hands of professional shipping men. In a sense, this is doubtless true. If all that was desired were to load ships rapidly to their full capacity and to send them promptly about their business there would be little justification for disturbing the ordinary course of the shipping industry; but such achievements, however desirable in themselves, are only the minor tactics of shipping operation in time of war. There remains a sort of maritime grand strategy—an ultimate military and political policy in the use of ships. This is something largely outside the experience of practical shipping men. It is something necessarily to be decided by the policy leaders of the belligerent nations. The Transport Council was designed to assist in decisions of this character. The real test of the council's services is to be found in the character of the broad policies which it has recommended.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN NEEDS CARED FOR

In dealing with all the specific shipping problems which have presented themselves, the council has had to strike a balance between the needs of the immediate military situation and the general needs of staple industries and civilian populations. In military crises the tendency is to press all ships into the transportation of troops and munitions, but military success, in the long run, depends quite as fundamentally on at least the minimum of food and clothing required to sustain the civilian population, and on the raw materials for industries which indirectly underlie the operations of the armies in the field.

A second general aim of the council has been to bring all materials from the nearest practicable source. Ships have been drawn from distant parts of the world and concentrated, to an extraordinary extent, in the North Atlantic and Western Mediterranean. The wheat and wool of Australia and, to a lesser extent, the similar resources of South America, have been left unused so long as the wants of the Allies could, in any way, be supplied from regions nearer at hand.

The council has supervised the assignment of chartered neutral tonnage to the uses of the several Allies and has exercised a general supervision over the employment of all shipping, chartered, loaned and owned

outright. In 1918 no allied nation could use even its own ships wastefully without, in effect, wasting the shipping of the other Allies.

Among the special problems which confronted the council, one of the most persistent and difficult was the supply of coal to France and Italy. The demand for coal in all the belligerent countries was abnormal. Railroad facilities were overtaxed and congested. Unusually large quantities of coal had therefore to be carried to Italy directly by ship, through seas peculiarly menaced by submarines. The problem, already difficult, became acute when the German advance of March and April brought the Paris-Amiens railroad line under fire and virtually cut off the coal producing region of the Pas de Calais. To meet this new emergency without permanently diverting to collier service large ocean steamers indispensable for other work was then, and has remained, a matter of great difficulty. However, by interallied co-operation the most urgent needs of Italy and France were met at the same time that the increased troop transport of last summer was being maintained.

More recently the council was obliged to recommend an apportionment of the shipping prospectively available for 1919 between the transport of troops, the carriage of munitions and the supply of food to the Allies.

The agreement, which was reached after long investigation and conference, involved not merely a revision of the scale of all these programs, but an intricate arrangement of priorities of shipment, giving the preference at one period of the year to troop movements and at other periods to munitions and food, respectively. The importance of such an agreement would have been difficult to exaggerate if the war had continued into 1919.

TWO MEMBERS FROM EACH NATION

The Transport Council consists of two members from each of the four participating nations. The United States is represented on the Council by the Honorable Raymond Bartlett Stevens, vice chairman of the United States Shipping Board, and Honorable George Rublee. The senior British representative has been Lord Robert Cecil, formerly minister of blockade, later assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs, and now the British specialist on the League of Nations at the Peace Conference. Associated with him was Sir Joseph Maclay, the British shipping controller. The French representatives are M. Clémentel, minister of commerce, and M. Loucheur, minister of munitions. The Italian food controller, Signor Silvio Crespi, has been one of the Italian representatives on the council from the beginning. Associated with

him, from time to time, have been Signor Bianchi, in charge of the Italian railway transportation, General dall'Olio, of the munitions ministry, Signor Villa, minister of marine, and other high officials.

The council is thus an organization of ministerial rank. As such it meets only at intervals. The execution of its decisions and the conduct of the investigations upon which those decisions are based are the tasks of an underlying permanent organization,—the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, which rests in turn on the work of expert staffs of the several nations. The most considerable of these national staffs is the staff of the British ministry of shipping. The American shipping mission in London, in co-operation with other American representatives abroad, acts for the United States. Similar missions are maintained in London by the French and Italian Governments.

The Transport Executive, collaborating with the various national missions, maintains systematic records of the shipping available for the use of the Allies, including careful reports of new construction, charters, sinkings, etc. The movements of all these vessels are also constantly reported to the executive. To assist in this work, the British minister of shipping has turned over to the Transport Executive its elaborate card catalogue record of the particulars and movements of British, allied and neutral ships—an imposing compilation, which occupies one entire floor of a large building and requires a large staff, working day and night, receiving and recording cabled shipping intelligence from all parts of the world.

IMPORT PROGRAM COMMITTEES ORGANIZED

Thus equipped with information concerning available shipping facilities, the technical staff of the council has, from the first, sought equally complete information regarding the necessary demands upon the ships. Immediately after the first meeting of the council last spring, estimates were prepared by Great Britain, France and Italy, setting forth the minimum requirements of commodities to be imported overseas during 1918. It was found that even these minimum requirements exceeded the capacity of the shipping prospectively available by nearly ten million tons of goods. A re-survey of the requirements was therefore obviously necessary. To make this survey a new and interesting international machinery was set up in the form of the so-called Import Program Committees.

Previous estimates of import requirements had been made nation by nation. France, for example, would submit its official summary of requirements, including requirements of munitions, food stuffs, cotton, coal, etc. The other countries would do likewise. When it was discovered that the aggregate of the different national demands was in excess of the physical possibilities of transportation, it would be necessary to submit the claims of each nation to criticism, by the others, with a view to their reduction. This procedure was likely to arouse international friction and was not well fitted to secure an intelligent and equitable revision of all the import schedules in detail. It was therefore decided to take the adjustment of import programs out of the sphere of high politics and assign it to international groups of experts, designated to deal separately and specifically with each of the more important commodities. There were thus set up a score or more of International Import Program Committees. For example, committees were created for cotton, for wool, for timber, for wheat and other cereals, for meats and fats, for petroleum, for nitrates, etc. Some of these Program Committees were developed from pre-existing international organizations, like the Wheat Executive. Others were newly created. When the Food Council and Munitions Council were established last summer the Program Committees dealing with food were placed under direct charge of the International Committee of Food Representatives. The committees on steel, non-ferrous metals, explosives, etc., were organized under the Munitions Council. But the results of the deliberation of the Program Committees, whether reported directly to the Transport Executive or through the Food Council and the Munitions Council, became finally the basis of the recommendations of the Transport Council and therefore of the official decision of the Allies, with reference to the authorized uses of shipping.

DEVELOPED INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The significance of this system of Program Committees is not to be measured merely by the import programs which they formulated. The constant collaboration of the different national representatives in these committees, month after month, gave rise to habits of joint action and a free interchange of information which exerted an important influence in the development of international co-operation and good will.

The armistice has foreshadowed the end of the Allied Maritime Transport Council as a war organization, and the Allies, after their brief expe-

rience of economic co-operation, must now decide whether the Transport Council and similar agencies are to be continued through the period of peace negotiations and whether such agencies, in modified form, may be serviceable as permanent forms of international co-operation. Opinions naturally differ on questions like these; but many persons have come to feel that the experience and good will that have resulted from international joint action are not lightly to be discarded. As Lord Robert Cecil has put it, the economic machinery which has been built up in time of war ought to be turned by the Allies to the uses of peace. His views have been echoed by statesmen of the other allied nations. There are not a few to-day who believe that the surest foundation of a real and workable League of Nations is to be found in the joint international administration of economic affairs, in which the war has helped us to recognize a common international interest.

THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

I. PURPOSE AND MEANING

It will, of course, be long after the close of the world war that the full story of the remarkable co-operative administration of the powers pitted against the Central Quadruple Alliance which is associated with the name of the Supreme War Council¹ can be told from the documents themselves, but it is possible now to give an accurate idea of the origin and main lines of activity of the council, which, since it resulted in the decision for a unified command in May, 1918, has been universally recognized by the enemies of the Central Powers as the foremost vehicle of victory itself.

The Supreme War Council is the creation of circumstances. Like most institutional organs of value necessity was the mother of its invention. The state system of the Central Powers, all bureaucratic in character, offered little fundamental difficulty to establishing both unified command and common—if not single—control of supplies. These advantages, coupled with their possession of interior military lines, accounted for a number of their successes in battle, and were at the bottom of the Italian disaster in October, 1917. After it the Allies were forced for their own sake to do something to make their strength liquid enough for use on whatever part of the front it was needed.

The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, making available to the Allies its enormous resources and its potential man power. It was obvious that its millions of soldiers would not appear on the fighting fronts for several months, but its navy was ready for action and immediately began bearing its share of the brunt of the maritime operations. Also ready for action, to the extent of shipping facilities, were the resources of America,

NOTE: The facts and statements in this publication are chiefly taken from the news columns of the London *Times*.

¹The French name is Conseil supérieure de guerre.

monetary and material. On land and sea the heart, soul and substance of the United States were in the fight against Prussianism. It was natural that the Washington Government should assume an important part in the councils of the enemies of Germany, for America's entry into the war was recognized as the makeweight that insured victory. American influence was exerted in two directions—co-operation of the fighting forces and equitable distribution of the supplies which it was furnishing in generous quantities.

In November, 1917, therefore, the military requirement of a more closely unified command and the inevitable problem of the allocation of American supplies rendered necessary a review of the whole subject of co-operation.

The first forecast of coming events, so far as the public was concerned, was the sailing of an American mission to Europe on October 27, 1917. It arrived in England on November 6 and two days later the Department of State made an announcement which emphasized that the forthcoming meeting was a "war conference with the object of perfecting a more complete co-ordination of the activities of the various nations engaged" against Germany.¹

THE RAPALLO AGREEMENT

The next day a dispatch from Rome semi-officially announced that a decision was reached in the conference at Rapallo a few days before to create a Supreme Political Council of the Allies for the whole of the western front. This council was to be assisted by a permanent central military committee. The following were appointed members of this committee:

France—General Ferdinand Foch.

Great Britain—General Sir Henry Wilson.

Italy—General Luigi Cadorna. (To take General Cadorna's place in the supreme command, the king nominated General Diaz, chief of the general staff, and under him Generals Badoglio and Giardino.)

¹For text see Appendix I, page 402.

As a result of the Rapallo conference an agreement was taken by France, Great Britain and Italy in the following terms:

1. With a view to better co-ordination of military action on the western front, a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the prime minister and a member of the Government of each of the great powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other great powers.

2. The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the decision of the Governments, and keeps itself informed of their execution and reports thereon to their respective Governments.

3. The general staffs and military commands of the armies of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective Governments.

4. The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the Governments, insures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

5. Each power delegates to the Supreme War Council one permanent military representative, whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the council.

6. The military representatives receive from the Government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

7. The military representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces and the means of all kinds of which the allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

8. The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the permanent military representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places, as may be agreed upon, according to the circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.¹

The United States afterward adhered to this agreement.²

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 389-390.

² The War Cabinet. Report for the year 1917, page 15.

"MACHINERY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS"

No one in official life has since made it his business to tell the story of the developments which followed so far as they relate to the present co-ordination in the Supreme War Council, which amounts to an international government for the purpose of pooling and distributing resources in the interest of a common victory. In the absence of details, however, we are fortunate to have accounts of its main lines of accomplishment and material for determining its significance in the words of actual participants.

"It would be rather interesting," said Premier Lloyd George of Great Britain in a review of the year for the House of Commons on December 28, 1917, "if it were possible to project ourselves into the year 2017, to look at the year 1917, and to observe the events of this particular year. I should like to know what in the opinion of many who are present here to-day would be the outstanding events a hundred years hence. There is no doubt that the Russian revolution would hold a very conspicuous position. . . . Another great fact of this year which will loom large in the future will be the advent of America for the first time, not into the war, but into world politics, a gigantic event in itself. . . .

". . . Another event which will hold a conspicuous position in history, according to the use which is made of it, will be the setting up of the International Council at Versailles, where for the first time we have had provided the machinery of the League of Nations, where nations have come together to set up a complete machine which is a clearing house not merely in military matters and in naval matters, but for financial, for economic, for shipping, for food purposes, and for all the other things that are essential to the life of the nations. All these matters are raised there and are discussed there. Information on them all is classified there and interchanged; and, still more, the machinery is there not merely for registering or recording, but for decisions which affect all these nations. That in itself is going to be the beginning of something which will have a greater effect in international relations than anyone can imagine at this particular moment.

“Perhaps the House, having had one or two discussions on that topic, would like to know something as to how that idea is being carried out. I am very glad to say that so far it has been a conspicuous success. Not merely has it been free from friction, but it has helped to remove friction. The general staffs of all the various countries have found in it a means of discussion and of interchanging views, and it has helped them to come to decisions, a means which they did not possess before. . . . They are using it freely and it has been helpful to them, and they are constantly resorting to it. And I have no doubt at all that if that great machinery already started, to which the four Governments have given some of their very best men and minds, goes on working as it does at the present moment and developing strength it will have a very potent influence in unifying the war direction, and not merely the war direction, but the economic direction of the four great countries which are represented on this council.”

SCOPE OF THE COUNCIL

The Supreme War Council consists of the premiers of Great Britain, France and Italy, and the President of the United States, that is to say, of the executive heads of the four Governments. It decides finally upon recommendations made by interallied councils and committees where these have not been normally referred by national representatives on those bodies to their own Governments for transmission to the Supreme War Council, or for decision otherwise. In this way the Supreme War Council comes into contact with the Board of Military Representatives and the Allied Naval Council; the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and its subordinate Food and Munition Councils, the Program Committees and the Petroleum Conference; the Interallied Council on War Purchases and Finance, the Commission internationale de ravitaillement, the Allied Blockade Committee, the Interallied Scientific Food Commission, the Interallied Chartering Executive, and the Commission for Relief in Belgium.

Its object “is to create a real unity of policy in the conduct of the war—a unity of policy which takes account of all factors, economic and political, as well as purely military and naval, for the

one end of gaining the victory.”¹ But it is well to observe that it is composed of statesmen and not military men.

It is therefore the combined executive of four great states for definite purposes, which purposes can be increased in number whenever occasion demands.

The Supreme War Council itself is primarily a political body. It may be concluded that each member state has a single vote. The American ballot has been cast by the President by cable,² while the British, French and Italian Governments customarily send a delegation to the meetings consisting of the premier and at least one cabinet minister. Those present at the sessions vary from meeting to meeting, experts on subjects under consideration being invited to lay their views before the council or being regularly attached to its staff.

PROGRESS OF THE COUNCIL

The advance made by this organization was described by Lord Milner, British secretary of state for war, in an address at Plymouth on February 20, 1918, and his words must suffice for the time as an internal picture of the operation of the Supreme War Council:

The co-ordination of effort among the allied nations, which in theory has always commended itself to all of us, is most uncommonly difficult to realize in practice. Indeed, you may take it that it will never be perfectly realized; yet I hold it to be the very first duty of statesmen to get as near it as we possibly can. More progress has been made in that direction in the last three months than in the preceding three years, and if a great deal remains to be done we have at last got something like reasonable machinery for doing it. It has been my duty, during the 15

¹ Reuter dispatch, February 3, 1918.

² This statement is made on the authority of the *New York Times* (October 14, 1918), quoting Newton D. Baker, secretary of war. The following questions in the British Parliament are noted in this connection:

“The Chancellor of the Exchequer, asked by Mr. D. Mason whether the recent manifesto issued after the Versailles Conference represented the views of all the Allies, including the United States of America, said: The answer is in the affirmative.

“Mr. Chancellor: Was the President of the United States consulted? The Chancellor of the Exchequer: The President of the United States never had any opportunity of assenting or dissenting, but the diplomatic representative of the United States in conference was present.” (*London Times*, February 15, 1918, page 10.)

months that I have been in office, to attend some half-dozen interallied conferences of generals and statesmen. All I can say is that the last one or two at which I had the honor to be present were incomparably more businesslike than those which I attended a year ago, and that I believe the improvement is certain to be progressive. The reason is that we have now got in the Supreme War Council a body which has a definite constitution, and regular, though not too frequent, meetings, where formerly there were only a number of scratch conferences, of uncertain composition, summoned on the spur of the moment, passing resolutions, which it was often nobody's special business to carry out, and with nothing to connect one such conference with another.

The essence of the present system is that there now exists, under the Supreme War Council, a permanent body of experts, always at work together, always studying war problems from the point of view of the alliance as a whole, not from the separate points of view of the several nations, preparing the *agenda* for the meetings of the council, and providing for continuity of deliberation and action. I remember a year ago being present at a conference which spent the greater part of two days discussing the transfer of a single division from one theater of war to another. When I think of the nature and importance of the business transacted at recent meetings of the Supreme Council I realize the immense distance we have traveled in the direction of doing real business and giving a concrete meaning to the conception of a single allied front.

Lord Milner's statement of the relation between the council and the military problems of the war suggests the relations between it and all interallied organizations. The council consists primarily of the executive heads of the Governments concerned, but the five principal boards are made up of men of cabinet rank or administrative officials, who of necessity are subordinate to premiers or other executives. It is consequently certain that all decisions on interallied affairs not capable of determination by any board are put up to the Supreme War Council. Evidence increases that the great mechanism of victory centered in the Supreme War Council as the highest executive power in the world to-day.

But while the Supreme War Council is the physical machine of the existing League of Nations, it is not all-inclusive. It comprises only the executives of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, whereas the Governments associated against Ger-

many in the war number 21. Diplomatic interallied conferences are held when matters affecting them all are to be determined. In the intervals, the smaller Governments make their requisitions through the interallied organizations. Before these and the Supreme War Council existed such allied¹ or interallied conferences were the only means of taking executive decisions possessed by the whole group of nations at war with Germany.

PREVIOUS ALLIED CONFERENCES

Therefore, "during the early period of the war there were inter-governmental conferences at fairly frequent intervals whose purpose it was to adjust the plans of the different Allies. Indeed, from the beginning there has been a strongly marked tendency to substitute frequent personal meetings between members of Governments, ministers and departmental chiefs for the older and more formal channels of communication. Of late, however, the importance of treating the war as a single whole and the necessity for pooling the resources of the Allies so as to meet equitably the needs of all, as war demands increased and supplies diminished, had led to far closer and more frequent consultation. Thus, during 1917 there were conferences between the heads of the Governments or their specially delegated plenipotentiaries upon the major issues of diplomacy and the war in London, Paris, Rome, Petrograd, St. Jean de Maurienne, Calais, Folkestone and Rapallo."

"Intercommunication developed very rapidly during 1917. A special allied mission was sent to Russia by Great Britain in January to co-ordinate the preparations for the allied offensive, but its plans were disorganized by the Russian revolution. Immediately after the revolution, however, a member of the British War Cabinet went on a special mission of a political character to Petrograd, and this was followed by the visit of Arthur J. Balfour, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, to Washington, after

¹The adjective "allied" and the noun "Allies" in an accurate sense in the present war refer to the signatories of the declarations of September 5, 1914, and November 30, 1915, that is, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia. The last recognized government in Russia was that headed by Kerenskii.

the entry of the United States into the war. This last mission developed into a permanent organization of considerable size.¹

"During the year, however, an increasing number of inter-governmental and inter-departmental conferences took place both on diplomatic and military questions and on problems connected with the distribution between the Allies of imported supplies. This gradual integration of the Alliance was brought to a head toward the end of the year by the Rapallo agreement. During the year the democratic Alliance has thus acquired the rudiments of a permanent machinery."²

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS "DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE"

The significance of all this executive and administrative apparatus is more than the compelling fact that it won the war, more even than the necessary circumstance that it makes the return to peace simpler, quicker and surer than it otherwise could be. Its real significance lies in the impetus it gives to world organization.

Before the war governments had been combining for common purposes ever since the Congress of Vienna had stipulated that "states separated or traversed by a single navigable river engage to regulate the navigation of such river by common agreement." Posts, telegraphs, railroads, maritime navigation, and many other matters of mutual interest had similarly been the subjects of international arrangements, until at the outbreak of the war there were 53 institutions carrying out the will of the nations generally, and half as many conventions providing for unified practice which did not require administrative offices. All these international institutions withstood the effects of war and continued functioning during it, with the exception of those, like the European Commission of the Danube, that were deliberately and for their own interests put out of business by the Central Powers. To concentrate and combine them after the war³ is to establish the whole physical basis

¹ On the details of the activities of this mission see the little volume "Who's Who in the British War Mission," a new edition of which is about to be issued.

² The War Cabinet. Report for the year 1917, 15-16, v-vi.

³ Jean Perrinjaquet, "Projet pour la création d'un Bureau général international permanent," *Revue générale de droit international public*, XVIII, 216-237 (with

of a League of Nations upon the firmest possible foundations of mutual legal, financial, commercial, economic and social co-operation. The Supreme War Council and the two dozen councils and committees subordinate to it have become the integrated system which can and should include and develop all previous activities as the administrative organ of a League of Nations.

Those who object to a League of Nations on account of the difficulties which it presents will find a convincing answer to their doubts in the success which has attended the solution of the problems connected with establishing this *de facto* League of Nations, as represented by the Interallied Conference, the Supreme War Council and the organizations associated with it.

II. DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME

The date set for the "war conference" was November 16. The participants began to gather at Paris immediately after the Rapallo conference. On November 12 David Lloyd George, premier of Great Britain, at a luncheon in the old tapestry-room at the French ministry of war delivered a speech before the French Army Council, Senate and Chamber which lighted up the problem of a Supreme War Council for the world's public like a flash of lightning from a clear sky on a moonless night. Later Lloyd George explained the purpose of this speech, which is best introduced by his own words in the House of Commons:

We went to Rapallo with a document most carefully prepared—and may I say also, in order to explode another myth, that it was submitted to the [British] Cabinet before I left. The document which was passed was hardly different. Of course, we had to discuss things with our Allies, but in substance it was the document prepared here, discussed

French text of American project of convention); Denys P. Myers, "La Concentration des organismes internationaux publics," *La Vie internationale*, III, 96-122. This second article proposes, in elaboration of the earlier plan and on the basis of existing organs, international bureau departments of public law, private law, commerce, science, hygiene and morals, agriculture, land transportation, maritime transportation, posts and telegraphs, monetary unity, literary property and industrial property.

line by line in the Cabinet, which I had in my pocket after the last Cabinet meeting held a few hours before I left. But I was afraid of this, that here was a beautifully drafted document in which you had concerned a considerable number of men, including distinguished soldiers—for a member of the general staff was one who was most helpful to me in drafting the document—prepared, and carried by the Allies at two or three conferences. Nothing happened. Simply an announcement in the papers that at last we had found some means of co-ordination. There has been too much of that, and I made up my mind to take risks, and I took them, in order to arouse public sentiment, not here merely, but in France, in Italy and in America—to get public sentiment behind, to see that this document became an act. It is not easy to rouse public opinion. I may know nothing about military strategy, but I do know something of political strategy. To get public opinion interested in a proposal and to convince the public of the desirability of it is an essential part of political strategy. That is why I did it, and it has done it. I might have gone over there and delivered a speech—passing eulogies upon the armies, upon generals, upon Governments and peoples, and they would have said—probably civility would have made them say it—“That is a very fine and eloquent speech.” But it would have had not the slightest effect.

So I set out to deliver a disagreeable speech, that would force everybody to talk about this scheme. They have talked about it throughout two or three continents. The result is that America is in, Italy is in, France is in, Britain is in, and public opinion is in, and that is all I wanted.¹ . . .

BRITISH PREMIER'S STARTLING SPEECH

In the speech itself on November 12 the British premier said:

I must claim your indulgence for taking up the time of so many men who hold great and responsible positions in the state and the legislature at a moment when they can ill spare from the conduct of important affairs time for listening to speeches. My only apology is that I have important practical considerations to submit to you, which affect not merely the future of your own country and of mine, but the destiny of the world. I have one advantage in speaking of this war, in that I am almost the only minister in any land, on either side, who has been in it from the beginning to this hour. I therefore ought to know something

¹Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 901-902.

about the course of events and their hidden causes. Of both I want to say something to you to-day.

My friend and comrade, M. Painlevé, has explained to you the important decision taken by the Governments of France, Italy and Great Britain in setting up a Supreme Council of the Allies whose forces operate in the west to insure the united direction of their efforts on that front. As he has already explained, that council will consist of the leading ministers of the allied countries, advised by some of their most distinguished soldiers, and the choice which has already been made by these countries of their experts proves that the Governments mean this council to be a real power in the co-ordination of their military effort.

AMERICA AND RUSSIA

Unfortunately, there was no time to consult America and Russia¹ before setting up this council. The Italian disaster and the need of immediate action to repair it rendered it essential that we should make a start with the powers whose forces could be drawn upon for action on the Italian front. But in order to insure the complete success of this great experiment—an experiment the success of which I believe to be essential to victory for the allied cause—it is necessary that all our great Allies should be represented in its deliberations, and I look forward with confidence to securing the agreements of those two great countries and to their co-operation in the work of this council.

There are two questions which may be asked with reference to the step we have taken. Why are we taking it now? That is easy to answer: For the second question it is more difficult to find a satisfactory answer—why did we not take it before?

NEED FOR GREATER UNITY DEMONSTRATED

I propose to answer both. In regard to the first question, the events of the war have demonstrated, even to the most separatist and suspicious mind, the need for greater unity among the Allies in their war control. The Allies had on their side—in spite of all that has happened they still have at their command—all the essential ingredients of victory. They have command of the sea, which has never yet failed to bring victory in the end to the power that can hold out. On land they have the advantage in numbers, in weight of men and material, in economic and

¹The Russo-German armistice was not signed until a week after the delivery of the speech.

financial resources, and beyond and above all in the justice of their cause. In a prolonged war nothing counts as much as a good conscience. This combined superiority ought ere now to have insured victory for the Allies. At least it ought to have carried them much further along the road to victory than the point which they have yet reached. To the extent that they have failed in achieving their purpose, who and what are responsible? . . .

No, the fault has not been with the armies. It has been entirely due to the absence of real unity in the war direction of the allied countries. We have all felt the need of it. We have all talked about it. We have passed endless resolutions resolving it. But it has never yet been achieved. In this important matter we have never passed from rhetoric into reality, from speech into strategy.

In spite of all the resolutions there has been no authority responsible for co-ordinating the conduct of the war on all fronts, and in the absence of that central authority each country was left to its devices. We have gone on talking of the eastern front and the western front and the Italian front and the Saloniki front and the Egyptian front and the Mesopotamia front, forgetting that there is but one front with many flanks; that with these colossal armies the battlefield is continental.

EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT UNITY

As my colleagues here know very well, there have been many attempts made to achieve strategic unity. Conferences have been annually held to concert united action for the campaign of the coming year. Great generals came from many lands to Paris with carefully and skilfully prepared plans for their own fronts. In the absence of a genuine Inter-allied Council of men responsible as much for one part of the battlefield as for another there was a sensitiveness, a delicacy about even tendering advice, letting alone support for any sector other than that for which the generals were themselves directly responsible. But there had to be an appearance of a strategic whole, so they all sat at the same table and, metaphorically, took thread and needle, sewed these plans together, and produced them to a subsequent civilian conference as one great strategic piece; and it was solemnly proclaimed to the world the following morning that the unity of the Allies was complete.

That unity, in so far as strategy went, was pure make-believe; and make-believe may live through a generation of peace—it cannot survive a week of war. It was a collection of completely independent schemes

pieced together. Stitching is not strategy. So it came to pass that when these plans were worked out in the terrible realities of war the stitches came out and disintegration was complete.

I know the answer that is given to an appeal for unity of control. It is that Germany and Austria are acting on interior lines, whereas we are on external lines. That is no answer. That fact simply affords an additional argument for unification of effort in order to overcome the natural advantages possessed by the foe.

You have only to summarize events to realize how many of the failures from which we have suffered are attributable to this one fundamental defect in the allied war organization. We have won great victories. When I look at the appalling casualty lists I sometimes wish it had not been necessary to win so many. Still, on one important part of the land front we have more than held our own. We have driven the enemy back. On the sea front we have beaten him, in spite of the infamy of the submarine warfare. We have achieved a great deal; I believe we should already have achieved all if in time we had achieved unity.

There is one feature of this war which makes it unique among all the innumerable wars of the past. It is a siege of nations. The Allies are blockading two huge empires. It would have been well for us if at all times we had thoroughly grasped the fact that in a siege not only must every part of the line of circumvallation be strong enough to resist the strongest attack which the besieged can bring to bear upon it; more than that, the besieging army must be ready to strike at the weakest point of the enemy, wherever that may be. Have we done so? Look at the facts.

THE GATEWAY TO THE EAST

The enemy was cut off by the allied navies from all the rich lands beyond the seas, whence he had been drawing enormous stores of food and material. On the east he was blockaded by Russia, on the west by the armies of France, Britain and Italy. But the south, the important south, with its gateway to the east, was left to be held by the forces of a small country with half the population of Belgium, its armies exhausted by the struggles of three wars and with two treacherous kings behind, lying in wait for an opportunity to knife it when it was engaged in defending itself against a mightier foe.

What was the result of this inconceivable blunder? What would any man whose mind was devoted to the examination of the whole, not merely to one part of the great battlefield, have expected to happen?

Exactly what did happen. While we were hammering with the whole of our might at the impenetrable barrier in the west, the Central Powers, feeling confident that we could not break through, threw their weight on that little country, crushed her resistance, opened the gate to the east, and unlocked great stores of corn, cattle and minerals, yea, unlocked the door of hope—all essential to enable Germany to sustain her struggle.

Without these additional stores Germany might have failed to support her armies at full strength. Hundreds of thousands of splendid fighting material were added to the armies which Germany can control—added to her and lost to us. Turkey, which at that time had nearly exhausted its resources for war, cut off from the only possible source of supply, was re-equipped and resuscitated, and became once more a formidable military power, whose activities absorbed hundreds of thousands of our best men in order to enable us at all to retain our prestige in the east. By this fatuity this terrible war was given new life.

Why was this incredible blunder perpetrated? The answer is simple. Because it was no one's business in particular to guard the gates of the Balkans.

“TOO LATE”

The one front had not become a reality. France and England were absorbed in other spheres. Italy had her mind on the Carso. Russia had a 1,000-mile frontier to guard, and, even if she had not, she could not get through to help Serbia, because Rumania was neutral. It is true we sent forces to Saloniki to rescue Serbia, but, as usual, they were sent too late. They were sent when the mischief was complete.

Half of those forces sent in time—nay, half the men who fell in the futile attempt to break through on the western front in September of that year—would have saved Serbia, would have saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of Germany.

You may say that is an old story. I wish it were. It is simply the first chapter of a serial which has been running to this hour. 1915 was the year of tragedy for Serbia; 1916 was the year of tragedy for Rumania. The story is too fresh in our memories to make it necessary for me to recapitulate events. What am I to say? I have nothing but to say that it was the Serbian story almost without a variation. It is incredible when you think of the consequences to the allied cause of the Rumanian defeat. . . .

If you want to appreciate thoroughly how we were waging four wars and not one, I will give you one fact to reflect upon. In 1916 we had the

same conference in Paris and the same appearance of preparing one great strategic plan. But when the military power of Russia collapsed in March, what took place? If Europe had been treated as one battlefield you might have thought that when it was clear that a great army which was operating on one flank and could not come up in time, or even come into action at all, there would have been a change in strategy. Not in the least.

PLANS ESSENTIALLY INDEPENDENT

Their plans proceeded exactly as if nothing had occurred in Russia. Why? Because their plans were essentially independent of each other and not part of a strategic whole. You will forgive me for talking quite plainly because this is no time for concealing or for glossing over facts. War is pre-eminently a game where realities count. This is 1917. What has happened? I wish there had even been some variety in the character of the tragedy. But there has been the same disaster due to the same cause. Russia collapsed. Italy was menaced. The business of Russia is to look after her own front. It is the concern of Italy to look after her own war. "Am I my brother's keeper?" Disastrous! Fatal! The Italian front is just as important to France and Britain as it was to Germany. Germany understood that in time. Unfortunately we did not.

It is no use minimizing the extent of the disaster. If you do, then you will never take adequate steps to repair it. When we advance a kilometer into the enemy's lines, snatch a small shattered village out of his cruel grip, capture a few hundreds of his soldiers, we shout with unfeigned joy. And rightly so, for it is the symbol of our superiority over a boastful foe and a sure guaranty that in the end we can and shall win.

But what if we had advanced 50 kilometers beyond his lines and made 200,000 of his soldiers prisoners and taken 2,500 of his best guns, with enormous quantities of ammunition and stores? What print would we have for our headlines? Have you an idea how long it would take the arsenals of France and Great Britain to manufacture 2,500 guns?

At this moment the extent to which we can prevent this defeat from developing into a catastrophe depends upon the promptitude and completeness with which we break with our past and for the first time realize in action the essential unity of all the allied fronts. I believe that we have at last learned this great lesson. That is the meaning of this Superior Council. If I am right in my conjectures then this council

will be given real power, the efforts of the Allies will be co-ordinated, and victory will await valor. We shall then live to bless even the Italian disaster, for without it I do not believe it would have been possible to secure real unity. Prejudices and suspicions would have kept us apart. Had we learned this lesson even three months ago what a difference it would have made!

A DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON

I must read to you a message which appeared in *The Times* three days ago from its Washington correspondent. It is a message of the first importance, for, in the words of an old English saying, "Outsiders see most of the game." And these shrewd men in America, calmly observing the course of events from a distance of thousands of miles, have come to conclusions which we would have done well to make ours years ago:

"It is realized here that delicate questions of prestige exist between the great European nations engaged in the war, and that this militates against quick decisions and effective action when these are most needed. It is believed by some of President Wilson's closest advisers that Germany owes much of her success in this war to her unity of control, which permits the full direction of all Teutonic efforts from Berlin. Indeed, it is felt here that unless the Allies can achieve a degree of co-ordination equal to that which has enabled Germany to score her striking, though perhaps ineffectual, successes, she will be able to hold out far longer than otherwise would have been believed possible. American military experts believe that if the allied help rushed to General Cadorna's assistance to stem the tide of invasion had been thrown into the balance when Italy's forces were within 40 miles of Laibach, the Allies would have been able to force the road to Vienna. Victory at Laibach would have spelled a new Austerlitz, and the magnitude of the prize almost within his grasp is believed here to have justified General Cadorna in taking the risk of advancing his center too far and temporarily weakening his left flank. The lack of co-operation between France, Great Britain and Italy is blamed here for the disaster which ensued, and which it is believed would not have occurred if one supreme military authority had directed the combined operations of the Allies with the sole aim of victory without regard to any other considerations."

You may say the American estimate of the possibilities of the Italian front for the Allies is too favorable. Why? It is not for me to express an opinion. I am but a civilian; but I am entitled to point out that the Austrian army is certainly not better than the Italian. On the

contrary, whenever there was a straight fight between the Italians and the Austrians the former invariably won. And the Germans are certainly no better than the British and French troops. When there has been a straight fight between them we have invariably defeated their best and most vaunted regiments. And as for the difficulties of getting there, what we have already accomplished in the course of the last few days is the best answer to that.

THE SECOND QUESTION

But now I will answer the other question—Why was this not said before and why was this not done before? I have said it before, and I have tried to do it before, and so have some of my French colleagues that I see here. For weeks, for months, for years, at committees, at conferences, at consultations, until I almost became weary of the attempt, I have written it where it may be read and will be read when the time comes. I should like to be able to read you the statement submitted to the conference in Rome in January about the perils and the possibilities of the Italian front this year, so that you might judge it in the light of subsequent events. I feel confident that nothing could more convincingly demonstrate the opportunities which the Allies have lost through lack of combined thought and action.

We have latterly sought strenuously to improve matters by more frequent conferences and consultations, and there is no doubt that substantial improvement has been effected. As the result of that conference in Rome and the subsequent consultations, arrangements were made which shortened considerably the period within which aid could be given to Italy in the event of her being attacked. And if the tragedies of Serbia and Rumania are not to be repeated—and I feel assured that they will not, in spite of the very untoward circumstances—it will be because the preparations made as the result of the Rome conference have materially affected the situation. But if there had been real co-ordination of the military efforts of the Allies we should now have been engaged in Italy, not in averting disaster from our Allies, but in the inflicting of disaster upon our enemies. That is why we have come to the conclusion that for the cumbrous and clumsy machinery of conferences there shall be substituted a permanent council whose duty it will be to survey the whole field of military endeavor with a view to determining where and how the resources of the Allies can be most effectively employed. Personally I had made up my mind that, unless some change were effected,

I could no longer remain responsible for a war direction doomed to disaster for lack of unity.

NATIONAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES

The Italian disaster may yet save the alliance, for without it I do not believe that even now we should have set up a real council. National and professional traditions, prestige and susceptibilities all conspired to render nugatory our best resolutions. There was no one in particular to blame. It was an inherent difficulty in getting so many independent nations, so many independent organizations, to merge all their individual idiosyncrasies and to act together as if they were one people. Now that we have set up this council our business is to see that the unity which it represents is a fact and not a fraud.

It is for this reason that I have spoken to-day with perhaps brutal frankness, at the risk of much misconception here and elsewhere, and perhaps at some risk of giving temporary encouragement to the foe. This council has been set up. It has started its work. But particularism will again reassert itself, because it represents permanent forces deeply entrenched in every political and military organization. And it is only by means of public opinion awakened to real danger that you can keep these narrow instincts and interests, with the narrow vision and outlook which they involve, from reasserting their dominance and once more plunging us into the course of action which produced the tragedies of Serbia and Rumania and has very nearly produced an even deeper tragedy for Italy. The war has been prolonged by sectionalism; it will be shortened by solidarity.

If this effort at achieving solidarity is made a reality I have no doubt of the issue of the war. The weight of men, material and morale, with all its meaning, is on our side. I say so, whatever may happen to, or in, Russia. I am not one of those who despair of Russia. A revolutionary Russia can never be anything but a menace to Hohenzollernism. But even if I were in despair of Russia, my faith in the ultimate triumph of the allied cause would remain unshaken. The tried democracies of France, Great Britain and Italy, with the aid of the mighty democracy of the west, must win in the end. Autocracy may be better for swift striking, but Freedom is the best stayer. We shall win, but I want to win as soon as possible. I want to win with as little sacrifice as possible. I want as many as possible of that splendid young manhood which has helped to win victory to live through to enjoy its fruits.

REAL, NOT SHAM, UNITY

Unity—not sham unity, but real unity—is the only sure pathway to victory. The magnitude of the sacrifices made by the people of all the allied countries ought to impel us to suppress all minor appeals in order to attain the common purpose of all this sacrifice. All personal, all sectional, considerations should be relentlessly suppressed. This is one of the greatest hours in the history of mankind. Let us not dishonor greatness with pettiness.

I have just returned from Italy, where I saw your fine troops marching cheerily to face their ancient foes, marching past battlefields where men of their race once upon a time wrought deeds which now constitute part of the romance of this old world—Arcola, Lodi, Marengo. We met the King of Italy on the battlefield of Solferino, and we there again saw French soldiers pass on to defend the freedom which their fathers helped to win with their blood. When I saw them in such environment I thought that France has a greater gift for sacrificing herself for human liberty than any nation in the world. And as I reflected on the sacrifices she had made in this war for the freedom of mankind I had a sob in my heart. You, assembled here to-day, must be proud that you have been called to be leaders of so great a people at so great an hour. And as one who sincerely loves France, you will forgive me for saying that I know that, in the discharge of your trust, you will in all things seek to be worthy of so glorious a land.

FRENCH PREMIER'S INDORSEMENT

Premier Paul Painlevé of France in his speech on the same occasion paid a glowing tribute to the services of Italy to the Allies, declaring that no Frenchman could forget that it was the benevolent neutrality of Italy in 1914 which enabled France to meet the invader with her full strength. Continuing he said:

Now, along every railway, every road, French and British soldiers, guns and munitions are pouring over the Alps. The help will be commensurate with the danger. The Allies must pool all their resources, all their energy, all their will to conquer. One Front, One Army, One Nation—that is the program of the future victory.

After contrasting enemy unity, which entailed brutality and the subjection of one people to another, M. Painlevé continued:

We are free peoples who refuse to accept this subjection. The task of the new Interallied War Committee or Supreme War Council which has just been formed by the great allied nations will be to reconcile this independence with unity of leading. . . . To hold on—that is the whole question. There is no need to count our enemies. The whole matter is to be resolved to make the necessary effort to beat them and to be convinced that we can do it.

The next day Premier Painlevé made a formal statement to both houses of the French Parliament, in which he reviewed the whole situation. It throws additional light on the military situation of the period¹ and resulted in a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies, 250 ayes, 192 noes.

Shortly after the favorable vote in the Chamber on the speech that body took up the discussion of the date of the interpellation on the defeatist scandals, involving broadly the Bolo Pasha, Malvy and Caillaux affairs. The ministry insisted on fixing November 30 as the date and the Chamber rejected the proposal, 277 noes to 186 ayes. The Painlevé ministry left the Chamber to resign.

A BRITISH POLITICAL CRISIS

In England the news of the Rapallo agreement and the speech of Lloyd George on November 12 generated the first of a series of political crises due to the fear on the part of a certain section of the House of Commons that the Supreme War Council might curtail the freedom of decision of the chief of the general staff. The matter came up on November 14 when the former premier, Herbert Henry Asquith, asked the premier "whether he would now state the precise functions of the interallied council, and, in particular, of its military staff; whether it was proposed that the council, if so advised by its staff, should have the power to interfere with and override the opinion on matters of strategy of the general staff at home and the commanders-in-chief in the field; whether the military staff of the interallied council was to have intelligence and operations departments, or either of them, of its own; whether the ultimate decision as to the distribution and

¹ For text see Appendix II, page 403.

movement of the various armies in the field was to rest on the council or on the Governments represented on it; and whether opportunity would be given to discuss the proposed arrangements and the statements made in connection therewith in the premier's Paris speech."

Premier Lloyd George in reply said that the best way of answering the question was to read the actual terms of the agreement between the British, French and Italian Governments, which he did. He made a further explanation, saying:

From the foregoing it will be clear that the council will have no executive power, and that the final decisions in matters of strategy, and as to the distribution and movements of the various armies in the field, will rest with the several Governments of the Allies. There will therefore be no operations department attached to the council. The permanent military representatives will derive from the existing intelligence departments of the Allies all the information necessary in order to enable them to submit advice to the Supreme Allied Council. The object of the Allies has been to set up a central body charged with the duty of continuously surveying the field of operations as a whole and, by the light of information derived from all fronts and from all Governments and staffs, of co-ordinating the plans prepared by the different general staffs, and, if necessary, of making proposals of their own for the better conduct of the war.¹

PROPOSED BY MILITARY COMMANDERS

He promised to make a more extended statement on the following Tuesday, and at that time silenced all criticism. Replying to a speech of Mr. Asquith on that day, November 19, Lloyd George said:

Who was the first to suggest the idea? It is rather important I should inform the House, because there has been a good deal of suggestion outside that this is an attempt to interfere with the staffs—an attempt on the part of civilians to interfere with the soldiers. Who was the first to suggest a council of this kind? Lord Kitchener. I have taken trouble to look up the records. In 1915 Lord Kitchener proposed it almost in the

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, XCIX, 390.

very terms in which I recommended it in Paris. That was in 1915, and I have no hesitation in saying if his advice had been carried out—I admit there were difficulties then and that it is easier to do it now than in 1915—but if his advice in 1915 had been carried out by all the Allies, I say without any hesitation we should have been further forward. . . .

The second time it was proposed was in July this year at a meeting of the commanders-in-chief. I forget whether all were there, but all the chiefs of staff were. At any rate, Sir William Robertson, General Pershing, General Cadorna and General Foch were there. They recommended, as a means for dealing with the situation, the setting up of an interallied council. Their proposal was “the realization of unity of action on the western front by the help of a permanent interallied military organization which will study and prepare the rapid movement of troops from one theater to another.” When it is suggested that all this is a device on the part of civilians to get control of strategy I am glad of the opportunity which has been afforded me to quote the authority of these great soldiers as proof that the initiation of the suggestion came from them in the first instance, and not from politicians.

HOW TO CO-ORDINATE

I come to the second point. Having agreed that it is desirable to get some sort of central authority in order to co-ordinate—I use the word [Mr. Asquith] used, there is no better—what is the best method of doing it? He examined three alternatives. I am in complete agreement with him in his views with regard to the first two. The first has been put forward in very responsible quarters, and that is the appointment of a generalissimo, a generalissimo of the whole of the forces of the Allies. . . .

The second suggestion is a suggestion which finds favor, not only in France but in America. America, France, Britain, Italy have agreed to join in this allied council, but, so far as I am able to gauge American opinion by the criticisms which have appeared in responsible newspapers, America would have preferred a council with executive powers—with greater powers. The criticism is not that we have gone too far, but that we have not gone far enough. There has been no criticism in any allied country on the ground that we have gone too far. . . .

The last alternative is the one we have adopted, a council representative of all allied countries with technical advisers drawn from all the allied armies to help the various Governments to co-ordinate their efforts. That is the present proposal. What are the advantages of this proposal

over the present and existing system? The first is that the information which is at the disposal of each of the allied staffs would then be at the disposal of this central council. Nominally that is so now, but it is only nominal. [Mr. Asquith] suggested that we should have something in the nature of *liaison* officers. That is the present system, and I do not believe that any general staff would say that it has at its disposal now all the information which is possessed by every general staff, even with regard to their own front, let alone with regard to the enemy. This central body will have distinguished representatives of each army upon it. Each of these representatives will be supplied with information from his own general staff. They will therefore be able, in the first instance, to co-ordinate information, and information is the basis of good strategy.

MILITARY COUNCIL SITS PERMANENTLY

What is the second point? They would sit continuously; it would be a permanent body. If the House will recollect, those are the very words used by the soldiers in that document which I have read when they recommended the setting up of a central permanent organization. Permanency is an essential part of it. The present system is a sporadic one, where you have got meetings perhaps once every three or four months, and barely that, for there is only one meeting a year between the whole of the staffs—that has been the rule—for the purpose of settling the strategy of the Allies over the whole of the battle fronts, which extend over thousands and thousands of miles, with millions of men in embattled array upon these fronts. A single day, with perhaps a morning added! No generals, however great their intuition, no generals, whatever their genius, could settle the strategy of a year at a sitting which only lasts over five or six hours. Utterly impossible! Therefore it is an essential part of the scheme that this body should be permanent, that they should sit together day by day, with all the information derived from every front before them, with the view to co-ordinating the plans of the general staffs over all the fronts.

COUNCIL SURVEYS WHOLE FIELD

The third point is that it will be the duty of this central body to survey the whole field and not merely a part of it. It may be said that each general staff does that at the present moment. In a sense they are bound, of course, to consider not merely their own front, but other fronts as

well, but it is a secondary matter. They naturally do not devote the same study to other fronts, and there is always a delicacy on the part of any general staff when it comes to interfere with the sphere of another general staff and another general. It is quite natural that they may say, "It is quite as much as we can do to look after our own particular front." There is a delicacy even in making suggestions. . . .

We have come to the conclusion that the mere machinery of *liaison* officers, the mere machinery of occasional meetings of ministers, of occasional meetings of chiefs of the staff, once or twice a year is utterly inadequate, utterly inefficient, for the purpose of securing real co-ordination, and that you must have a permanent body that would be constantly watching these things, constantly advising upon them, constantly reporting upon them to the Governments, whether it is our front, the French front, the Italian front, or the Russian front.

INFORMATION FROM NAVY

Now I come to the next point put by [Mr. Asquith] with regard to the navy. I quite assure [him] that the representation of the navy here is not an afterthought. It is essential that all the information with regard to naval operations and co-operation, it is essential that these military advisers should have someone there constantly in touch with them to inform them about that. It is a different thing from a naval council to co-ordinate naval strategy. There is a good deal to be said for that. We are suffering even in that sphere, as any one who knows what has been happening in the Mediterranean can tell. . . .

Now, if that speech was wrong I cannot plead any impulse. I cannot plead that it was something I said in the heat of the moment. I had considered it, and I did it for a deliberate purpose. I have seen resolutions for unity and for co-ordination. Where are they? You might as well have thrown them straight away into the waste-paper basket. Lord Kitchener tried it on January 28, 1915. I have seen other schemes by M. Briand and [Mr. Asquith], yet, somehow or other, they all came to nought, because naturally you got the disinclination of independent bodies to merge their individualities in a sort of common organization. It is inevitable and I was afraid that this would end in the same sort of way.¹

¹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series; XCIX, 895-898, 899, 901.

III. PROCEEDINGS OF INTERALLIED CONFERENCE

The date first set for the meeting of the Interallied Conference was November 16. But on November 14 the Painlevé ministry in France was overthrown and the reconstitution of the government with Georges Clemenceau as premier and minister of war did not occur until the 19th. England produced a brake to smooth progress when, simultaneously with these events, a drive against Premier Lloyd George began in Parliament for his having supposedly curtailed the power of the general staff by assenting to the Rapallo agreement. His answer on November 19, quoted in part above, silenced his critics. Meantime the head of the American mission then in London gave out for publication the fact that the President had cabled that the United States Government considered unity of plan and control between the Allies and America essential. The effect of this can be appreciated by realizing that as respected supplies America was at the time the Providence of the Allies, as Lloyd George remarked later without any objection from the general staff. With Clemenceau at the head of things in France and the British general staff once more off its feet and down to business, the way was clear for the meeting of the conference.

The Interallied Conference convened on November 29, 1917, at the Quai d'Orsay. That it was an important gathering can readily be seen from the mere list of the principal delegates:

France.—Georges Clemenceau, premier and minister of war; Stephen Pichon, minister of foreign affairs; Louis L. Klotz, minister of finance; Georges Leygues, minister of marine; Etienne Clementel, minister of commerce; Louis Loucheur, minister of munitions; Victor Boret, minister of provisions; M. Lebrun, minister of blockade and invaded region; André Tardieu, high commissioner to the United States; Jean Jules Cambon, general secretary to the Foreign Office; P. de Margerie, director of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Great Britain.—David Lloyd George, premier; Lord Milner, member of the War Cabinet without portfolio; Arthur James Balfour, secretary of state for foreign affairs; Lord Bertie, ambassador to France; Sir Eric Campbell Geddes, first lord of the Admiralty; General Sir William Robertson, chief of the imperial staff at army headquarters; Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, chief of the naval staff; Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary to the Committee on Imperial Defense; Lord Reading, special adviser on financial matters.

United States.—William Graves Sharp, ambassador to France; Edward Mandell House, chairman of special mission; Admiral William S. Benson, chief of naval operations; General Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff; Oscar Terry Crosby, assistant secretary of the Treasury; Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; Thomas Nelson Perkins of the Priority Board.

Italy.—Vittorio E. Orlando, premier and minister of the interior; Baron Sonnino, foreign minister; Francesco S. Nitti, minister of the Treasury; Count Bonin-Longare, ambassador to France; Signor Bianchi, minister of transports; General Alfredo dall' Olio, minister of munitions; General Cadorna.

Japan.—Viscount Chinda, ambassador to Great Britain; Mr. Matsui.

Belgium.—Baron Charles de Broqueville, foreign minister; Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, minister to France; General Rucquoy, chief of the general staff.

Serbia.—Nikola P. Pachich, premier and minister of foreign affairs; Milenko R. Vesnich, minister to France.

Rumania.—V. Antonescu, minister to France; General Iliescu, chief of the general staff.

Greece.—Elephtherios Constantine Venizelos, premier and minister of war; Athos Romanos, minister to France; Alexander Diomedes, former minister of finance; M. Agyropoulos, governor of Macedonia; Colonel Frantzis; M. Rottassis, naval attaché.

Portugal.—Affonso Costa, premier and minister of finance; Augusto Soares, minister of foreign affairs.

Montenegro.—Eugene Popovich, premier and minister of foreign affairs.

Brazil.—Antonio Olynthe de Magalhaes, minister at Paris.

Cuba.—General Carlos García y Velez, minister at London.

Russia.—Mathieu Sevastopulo, counselor of the embassy at Paris; M. Maklakov, ambassador to France (by special invitation and unofficially, as he had not yet presented his letters).

Siam.—M. Charoon, minister at Paris.

China.—Hu Wei Teh, minister in France; General Tang Tsai Lieh, vice secretary of the general staff of China.

Liberia.—Baron dé San Miguel.

FORMAL ADDRESSES AT THE MEETINGS

In opening the conference Georges Clemenceau, the French premier, said:

Gentlemen, I have the honor of bidding you welcome on behalf of the French Republic. In this the greatest war it is the feeling of the supreme solidarity of the peoples which finds us united in the desire to win upon the field of battle the right to a peace which will really be a peace of humanity. In this way we all here are a magnificent center of hopes, duties and wills, all united for all the sacrifices demanded by the alliance, which no intrigue and no defection can in any way shake. The high passions which animate us we must translate into acts. Our order of the day is to work. Let us work.

The session adjourned immediately after organization was completed and continued the working out of the program in committees composed of the appropriate delegates and the technical experts accompanying them. The final meetings of the Interallied Conference were held on December 3, the committees continuing their activities according to the character and advancement of their labors. At the final session only two speeches were made,

both indicative of the extremely businesslike manner of the whole conference. They were as follows:

EDWARD MANDELL HOUSE, chairman of the American mission: M. Clemenceau, in welcoming the delegates to this conference, declared that we had met to work. His words were prophetic. There have been co-ordination and unity of purpose which promise great results for the future. It is my deep conviction that by this unity and concentrated effort we shall be able to arrive at the goal which we have set out to reach.

In behalf of my colleagues I want to avail myself of this occasion to thank the officials of the French Government, and through them the French people, for the warm welcome and great consideration they have shown us. In coming to France we felt that we were coming to the house of our friends. Ever since our Government was founded there has been a bond of interest and sympathy between us—a sympathy which this war had fanned into passionate admiration. The history of France is the history of courage and sacrifice. Therefore the great deeds which have illuminated the last three years have come as no surprise to us of America. We knew that when called upon France would rise to splendid achievement and would add luster to her name. America salutes France and her heroic sons, and feels honored to fight by the side of so gallant a comrade.

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, premier of France, president of the Interallied Conference: As it is my duty to declare this conference closed, allow me to add a few words to those you have just heard. I came here fully intending to remain silent, so as to leave you under the spell of the impressive words which have just been uttered by my eminent friend, Mr. House, who so worthily represents American eloquence. As I listened to him I could not help thinking that, if there be a lesson to be learned from that historical friendship which to-day again unites in the memory of a glorious past the French and American nations, there is no less instruction in the total abolition of ancient feuds.

In the past we were the friends of America and the enemies of Great Britain. French and British fought bravely and loyally against each other, both on land and sea. The two peoples are to-day united in community of action and friendship. It is no longer a question of great and little nations. All peoples fighting for the same ideal of justice and liberty are great, and they will succeed in attaining that ideal by dint of sacrifices soon to be magnificently recompensed.

If I am to believe the newspapers, a guttural voice has made itself heard from the other side of the trenches mocking at this conference. This is no jesting matter. Our enemies, who recognize nothing but brute force, cannot understand us. We are all fighting at the dictates of the conscience of humanity, and wish simply the realization of right, justice and liberty. And we are met together to see that the right we have always sought shall become a reality.

Even if on the other side of the Rhine there is no desire to understand, the world expects our victory and will get it. All the peoples here represented are assisting each other for the success of the greatest of causes. Let us labor to win by our strength the right to peace.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The Department of State published a review of the report filed with it by Mr. House as head of the special American war mission on January 2, 1918. The report, said the Department of State, showed that the mission "succeeded in its purpose of reaching a definite working plan for the prosecution of the war through co-operation of the Governments represented at the conferences held in Paris in the various fields of activity and through marshaling the resources of the nations at war with the Central Powers and co-ordinating their uses under a common authority, thus avoiding the waste and uncertainties that arise from independent action."

The summary of the report is here quoted as the authentic statement of the work done by the Interallied Conference and the second session of the Supreme War Council, November 29-December 3, 1917:

The results of the conferences, as shown in the report, are most gratifying to this Government, first because they indicate that the conferees were inspired by the desire to be mutually helpful, and second because the agreements which were reached, when in full operation, will greatly increase the effectiveness of the efforts now being put forth by the United States and the Allies in the conflict against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

A summary of the results accomplished at their conferences and the recommendations made by the American mission will indicate the value

of the work done and the practical methods which were considered by the conferences and which are recommended in the report. The summary is as follows:

I. DIPLOMATIC

(1) Full and frank discussion between Colonel House as special representative of the Government of the United States and the heads of the British, French and Italian Governments with regard to the war policy of the United States and her associates in the war.

(2) Participation by the members of the mission in a meeting of the British War Cabinet, at which conference a general and useful discussion was had concerning the needs of the Allies and the extent of the assistance to be expected from the United States.

(3) Participation by the United States in an Interallied War Conference, held in Paris on November 29. At this conference all preliminary speeches were dispensed with and within half an hour after the conference had been called to order by M. Clemenceau it had split into committees for work.

(4) Participation by the United States in a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Versailles, December 1. Representatives of England, France, Italy and the United States there met as a first step toward securing unity of control of the armies on the western front. This meeting, the first of its kind, assures for the future unity of support on the part of the United States and the Allies.

(5) First steps taken in the establishment of a more perfect *liaison* between the commanding generals of the United States and the Allies.

II. NAVAL

(1) The formation of an Interallied Naval Council to co-ordinate the operation of the naval forces of the United States and her associates in the war, so that these forces may in the future be operated as one in the prosecution of the war on the sea and in conjunction with the land forces.

(2) An agreement between the British Admiralty and the Navy Department putting into effect certain plans relating to the prosecution of the naval war against the submarines.

(3) The formation of a definite plan for the more active utilization of American naval forces in conjunction with those of nations engaged in the war against the Central Powers.

(4) Agreement with the British Admiralty making it possible for American naval officers to keep fully informed of the operations and policy of the British Admiralty, so that perfect co-operation between the Navy Department and that body is assured.

(5) Reorganization of American naval forces at French ports.

(6) The securing of a full and detailed picture of the naval problem in European waters.

III. MILITARY

(1) After conferences extending over approximately 30 days with the chiefs of staff, members of the general staffs and commanders-in-chief of the allied armies on the western front, as well as with the highest civil officials of the respective Governments, the extent of the military effort to be aimed at by the United States was clearly determined.

(2) With this determination in mind negotiations were carried on looking to the pooling of resources for the mutual advantage of all of the countries engaged in the war against Germany. The contribution of the United States to this pooling arrangement was agreed upon. The contributions, likewise, of the countries associated with the United States were determined. This pooling arrangement guaranteed that full equipment of every kind would be available to all American troops sent to Europe during the year 1918.

(3) Unqualified support to the resolution adopted by the Interallied Conferences looking to the creation of an Allied Advisory Board charged with the duty of advising the shipping authorities of each nation concerning the allocation of tonnage so as to permit the American military effort to be realized.

(4) Full survey made of the problem of debarkation in Europe of American military forces and transportation of such forces and supplies to the bases of military operations.

(5) Arrangements made for fullest co-operation between the United States, Great Britain and France in the production of military instruments and supplies of all kinds.

(6) Plans made for the proper organization under naval and military control of ports of debarkation of troops and discharge of cargoes, looking to the most economical utilization of tonnage.

(7) Participation in military deliberations of the Supreme War Council as a step toward efficient and centralized unity of control of military operations.

IV. FINANCE

(1) Full detailed conferences with the financial representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania and Russia, for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of the financial effort necessary on the part of the United States in order properly to co-operate with these Governments in making financial arrangements for the prosecution of the war against the Central Powers.

(2) Conferences with the representatives of the above mentioned countries for the purpose of perfecting the organization of an interallied council, which is a priority board whose duty it should be to consider the relative importance and urgency of the financial demands to be made by the concerted effort of the countries waging war against the Central Powers.

(Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Crosby, the financial member of the mission, remained in Europe to act as president of the interallied council.)

(3) Arrangements begun for the proper financing of purchases by the countries at war with Germany of supplies from neutral countries.

(4) Participation in the financial discussions of the Interallied Conference.

V. SHIPPING

(1) Full and detailed reports were secured showing total loss of tonnage due to war risks and marine risks from August 1, 1914, to September 30, 1917.

(2) The estimated output of new tonnage by the Allies during the year 1918 was ascertained.

(3) The proper employment of existing tonnage so that the maximum utilization of such tonnage could be effected, was provided for in a resolution adopted by the Interallied Conference:

"The Allies, considering that the means of maritime transport at their disposal as well as the provisions which they dispose of should be utilized in common for the pursuit of the war, have decided to create an interallied organization for the purpose of co-ordinating their action to this effect and of establishing a common program constantly kept up to date; enabling them by the maximum utilization of their resources to restrict their importations with a view of liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops."

(4) The whole question of the employment of neutral tonnage in line with the proposals made by neutral countries with respect to this tonnage was exhaustively discussed and plans looking to the favorable result of tonnage negotiations with neutral countries were substantially agreed upon.

(5) A survey was completed of the ports of debarkation of American troops and supplies, and plans were made looking to the more expeditious discharge of troops and cargoes so as to permit the return of vessels to their home ports with the least possible delay.

VI. WAR TRADE

(1) Full and detailed conferences were held with the British, French and Italian representatives upon blockade matters, and a complete understanding was obtained of the principles under which these countries were proceeding.

(2) A mass of information was obtained with reference to rationing requirements of Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland.

(3) An agreement between the War Trade Board and the Swiss Society of Surveillance was agreed to and executed by the Swiss delegates and Mr. McCormick, the chairman of the War Trade Board.

(4) Arrangements were made for the participation of the United States in the deliberations of the Permanent International Commission on Contingents, sitting in Paris and on the Interallied Commission of Bern, Switzerland.

(5) Tentative plans subject to the approval of the War Trade Board were made for the appointment of representatives and staffs of the War Trade Board in London and Paris.

VII. WAR INDUSTRIES

(1) A detailed study was made of the organization of the British Ministry of Munitions and the supply departments of the British Admiralty and the British War Office, and a complete analysis of the facts and figures in possession of these departments of the British Government was made. The report embodying the results of these investigations contains a full statement of the methods in vogue in England for supplying the army and navy with munitions and other materials, and also statistics relating to the mutual co-operation necessary to be effected for

the proper supplying of the armed forces of the countries waging war on the Central Powers.

(2) A survey was made of the system in practice in Great Britain relating to the letting of Government contracts and the organization of industries throughout Great Britain.

(3) Attendance at the Interallied Conference in Paris and in particular at the meetings of the representatives of the several allied nations having to do with munitions questions.

(4) Full conferences with representatives of the United States Ordnance Department in France and representatives of British and French munitions departments stationed there, resulting in the embodying of conclusions in memoranda submitted to the War Department.

III. FOOD

(1) A comprehensive and accurate estimate was obtained of the food in the possession of the allied nations and of the amounts that must be supplied by North America during the year ending October 1, 1918. Cabled information had not been of a satisfactory nature and personal contact with the statistical boards and food administrations of the countries concerned was necessary in order that the necessary data could be made available.

(2) The curve of shipments of foodstuffs required from North America for the United Kingdom, France and Italy was fixed for the year ending October 1, 1918. It is believed that the program worked out in the conference with the several interallied executives dealing with supplies of foodstuffs will grant greater facilities for the distribution of foodstuffs at a lower cost in terms of tonnage and transportation.

(3) In order to permit the United States to visualize the problem of food control in North America, plans were worked out whereby the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy agreed to put into effect a legalized and compulsory control of foodstuffs in these countries.

(4) The creation by the Interallied Conference in Paris of an International Scientific Committee on Alimentation, to consist of two representatives each of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.¹ This committee to be in continuous session in Europe for the purpose of studying the alimentation of the Allies. This committee to stand in

¹ A delegate representing Belgium was subsequently added.

an advisory capacity to the food administrations of the aforementioned countries.

(5) Dr. Taylor, the representative of the Food Administration on the mission, represented the United States Department of Agriculture in a conference held in Paris to consider the problems of food production in the allied countries during the year 1918. At this conference, an Interallied Agricultural Committee was established to consist of one delegate each from the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, to sit continuously in Europe and to act in an advisory capacity to the Governments named.

RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO UNITED STATES

(1) That the United States exert all their influence to secure entire unity of effort, military, naval and economic, between themselves and the countries associated with them in the war.

(2) Inasmuch as the successful termination of the war by the United States and the Allies can be greatly hastened by the extension of the United States shipping program, that the Government and people of the United States bend every effort toward accomplishing this result by a systematic co-ordination of resources of men and materials.

(3) That the fighting forces of the United States be dispatched to Europe with the least possible delay incident to training and equipment.

IV. STATEMENTS OF POLICY

The Rapallo meeting in November, 1917, was the first session of the Supreme War Council, resulting in the constituent agreement and the organization of the Board of Military Representatives. Its second session consisted of the meetings at Paris, November 29-December 3, 1917, when the Interallied Naval Council, an allied shipping board, the Interallied Munitions Council, the Interally Council on War Purchases and Finance, the Permanent International Commission on Contingents, the International Scientific Commission on Alimentation and the International Agricultural Committee were either provided for or made subordinate to the council. The third session was held at Paris, January 30-Febru-

ary 2, 1918, and the fourth session at London, March 14-16, resulting in a statement on the Brest-Litovsk "peace."

The fifth session was held May 1-2 at Versailles and elsewhere in France. Naval and military advisers of the Governments, Generalissimo Foch and the commanders-in-chief of the American, British and French armies were present. The meetings were almost wholly concerned with military matters, the officials staying at the British Officers' Club at Abbéville, during the meeting. No official statement is available respecting that meeting.

The sixth session was held at Versailles June 3-4. In addition to the customary statement a second was issued respecting the aspirations of the Polish, Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slavic peoples. The session was attended by the British foreign secretary and Sir William Weir, chief of the British imperial general staff, besides the regular members. The presence of these two officials would suggest that the international political situation and the relation of the forces of the British self-governing dominions were discussed.

The seventh session was held July 2-5, and was followed by a formal statement.

A meeting was held in France, during the week of October 7-12 which was attended by the premiers, foreign ministers, naval and military advisers and others.

A meeting of the Supreme War Council began on October 30 at Versailles. It rapidly developed into an Interallied Conference, for it was the body which, with naval and military representatives as advisers, fixed the terms of the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and German armistices. "The conferences were attended by ministers representing France, Italy and Great Britain; by Colonel House representing the President of the United States; and by the naval and military advisers of the allied Governments; by representatives of Japan, Belgium, Serbia, Greece and Portugal; and also representatives of the Czecho-Slovaks. The first matter dealt with was the final elimination of Turkey from the war. . . . After the fullest consultation with both naval and military advisers the Supreme War Council agreed upon armistice conditions [for Austria-Hungary]. . . . The Supreme War Council proceeded to

consider the answer which they are making to the President of the United States covering his correspondence with the German Government . . . and the reply they should give to the German request for an armistice. . . . After the fullest deliberation with their naval and military advisers a complete agreement as to conditions was reached among the Allies.”¹

The enemies of Germany have come to look to Versailles for regular statements of their general policy in the conduct of the war. Apparently by agreement the summary of the American report given above did duty for a more formal statement on the first meeting. Since then the statements have been formally issued either from Versailles or London. They have been important guide posts for public opinion and before examining the activities of the committees it will be well if the reader has these to peruse as a whole. The formal statements issued, since the two sessions of the Supreme War Council in connection with the Interallied Conference of November–December, 1917, have been as follows:

THIRD SESSION, JANUARY 30–FEBRUARY 2, 1918

Seven meetings of the third session of the Supreme War Council were held at Versailles, January 30 and 31, February 1 and 2:

In addition to the members of the Supreme War Council itself, namely, Messieurs Clemenceau and Pichon for France, Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Milner for Great Britain, Professor Orlando and Baron Sonnino for Italy, and the military representatives of the Supreme War Council, Generals Weygand, Wilson, Cadorna and Bliss, there were also present for the greater part of the purely military discussions the French and British chiefs of general staff, Generals Foch and Robertson, the Italian minister of war, General Alfieri, and the commanders-in-chief on the western front, Petain, Haig and Pershing.

Mr. A. H. Frazier, first secretary of the United States embassy at Paris, was present during the political discussions.

The Supreme War Council gave the most careful consideration to the recent utterances² of the German chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian

¹ Premier Lloyd George, House of Commons, November 5, 1918.

² See texts of the speeches of January 24, 1918, by Chancellor Hertling for Germany and Count Czernin for Austria-Hungary, *A League of Nations*, Vol. I, No. 3, pages 139–158.

minister of foreign affairs, but was unable to find in them any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by all the allied governments.

This conviction was only deepened by the impression made by the contrast between the professed idealistic aims with which the Central Powers entered upon the present negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and their now openly disclosed plans of conquest and spoliation.

Under the circumstances the Supreme War Council decided that the only immediate task¹ before them lay in the prosecution of the war with the utmost vigor and the closest and most effective co-operation of the military effort of the Allies.

This effort must be prosecuted until such time as the pressure of that effort shall have brought about in the enemy Governments and peoples a change of temper which would justify the hope of the conclusion of peace on terms which would not involve abandonment, in the face of an aggressive and unrepentant militarism, of all the principles of freedom, justice and respect for the law of nations which the Allies are resolved to vindicate.

The decisions taken by the Supreme War Council in pursuance of this conclusion embrace not only a general military policy to be carried out by the Allies in all the principal theaters of the war, but, more particularly, a closer and more effective co-ordination under the council of all the efforts of the powers engaged in the struggle against the Central empires.

The functions of the council itself were enlarged, and the principles of unity of policy and action initiated at Rapallo in November last received still further concrete and practical development. On all these questions a complete agreement was arrived at after the fullest discussion, with regard to both the policy to be pursued and to the measures for its execution.

Complete agreement is thus established both among the Governments and the military chiefs in all necessary directions in order that resolutions on which all agree may receive their full effect.²

¹In the House of Commons debate on the King's address February 13, 1918, Mr. Holt moved as an amendment to the address:

"But regrets that, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, the prosecution of military effort is to be the only immediate task of your Majesty's Government."

The House divided, and there voted for the amendment, 28; against, 159; majority against, 131.

²This and the next two succeeding paragraphs are rendered as follows in the version given out by the British Government:

Hence there exists for all a calm feeling of strength, unfailing by reason of firm confidence in unanimous agreement, not only on arrangements and methods but principally on aims.

A coalition in broad daylight of hearts and wills which pursues no designs other than the defense of civilized peoples against the most brutal attempt at world domination opposes to the violence of the enemy the quiet confidence of the greatest energies unceasingly renewed.

The splendid soldiers of our free democracies have won their place in history by their immeasurable valor, and their magnificent heroism and the no less noble endurance with which our civilian populations are bearing their daily burden of trial and suffering testify to the strength of those principles of freedom which will crown the military success of the Allies with the glory of a great moral triumph.

STATEMENT ON THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE, MARCH 18, 1918

The prime ministers and foreign ministers of the Entente, assembled in London, feel it to be their bounden duty to take note of the political crimes, which under the name of a German peace, have been committed against the Russian people. Russia was unarmed. Forgetting that for four years Germany had been fighting against the independence of nations and the rights of mankind, the Russian Government, in a mood of singular credulity, expected to obtain by persuasion that "democratic peace" which it had failed to obtain by war.

The results were that the intermediate armistice had not expired before the German command, though pledged not to alter the disposition of its troops, transferred them *en masse* to the western front and so weak did Russia find herself that she dared to raise no protest against this flagrant violation of Germany's plighted word. What followed was of like character, when "the German peace" was translated into action. It was found to involve the invasion of Russian territory, the destruction or capture of all Russia's means of defense, and the organization of Russian lands for Germany's profit—a proceeding which did not differ from "annexation" because the word itself was carefully avoided.

"The Allies are united in heart and will, not by any hidden designs, but by their open resolve to defend civilization against an unscrupulous and brutal attempt at domination. This unanimity is confirmed by a unanimity no less complete both as regards the military policy to be pursued and as regards measures needed for its execution which will enable them to meet the violence of the enemy's onset with firm and quiet confidence, with the utmost energy and with the knowledge that neither their strength nor their steadfastness can be shaken."

The rendering given in the text is a literal translation from the French version as published in Paris.

Meanwhile those very Russians who had made military operations impossible found diplomacy impotent. Their representatives were compelled to proclaim that, while they refused to read the treaty presented to them, they had no choice but to sign it, so they signed it, not knowing whether in its true significance it meant peace or war nor measuring the degree to which Russian national life was reduced by it to a shadow.

For us of the Entente Governments the judgment which the free peoples of the world will pass on these transactions would never be in doubt. Why waste time over German pledges when we see that at no period in her history of conquest—not when she overran Silesia nor when she partitioned Poland—has she exhibited herself so cynically as a destroyer of national independence, the implacable enemy of the rights of man and the dignity of civilized nations?

Poland, whose heroic spirit has survived the most cruel of national tragedies, is threatened with a fourth partition and to aggravate her wrongs, devices by which the last trace of her independence is to be crushed are based on fraudulent promises of freedom.

What is true of Russia and Poland is no less true of Rumania, overwhelmed like them in a flood of merciless passion for domination.

Peace is loudly advertised, but under the thin disguise of verbal professions lurk the brutal realities of war and the untempered rule of a lawless force. Peace treaties such as these we do not and cannot acknowledge. Our own ends are very different. We are fighting, and mean to continue fighting, in order to finish once for all with this policy of plunder and to establish in its place the peaceful reign of organized justice.

As incidents of this long war unroll themselves before our eyes, more and more clearly do we perceive that the battles for freedom are everywhere interdependent; that no separate enumeration of them is needed and that in every case the single, but all-sufficient, appeal is to justice and right.

Are justice and right going to win? In so far as the issue depends on battles yet to come, the nations whose fate is in the balance may surely put their trust in the armies, which, even under conditions much more difficult than the present, have shown themselves more than equal to the great cause intrusted to their valor.

SIXTH SESSION, JUNE 4, 1918

The Supreme War Council has held its sixth session under circumstances of great gravity for the alliance of free peoples. The German Government, relieved of all pressure on its eastern front by the collapse

of the Russian armies and people, has concentrated all its efforts in the west; it is now seeking to gain a decision in Europe by a series of desperate and costly assaults upon the allied armies before the United States can bring its full strength effectively to bear. The advantage it possesses in its strategic position and superior railway facilities has enabled the enemy command to gain some initial successes; it will undoubtedly renew the attacks, and the allied nations may be still exposed to critical days.

After a review of the whole position, the Supreme War Council is convinced that the Allies, bearing the trials of the forthcoming campaign with the same fortitude which they have ever exhibited in the defense of right, will baffle the enemy's purpose, and in due course will bring him to defeat. Everything possible is being done to sustain and support the armies in the field. Arrangements for unity of command have greatly improved the position of the allied armies, and are working smoothly and with success.

The Supreme War Council has complete confidence in General Foch; it regards with pride and admiration the valor of the allied troops. Thanks to the prompt and cordial co-operation of the President of the United States, arrangements which were set on foot more than two months ago for the transportation and brigading of American troops will make it impossible for the enemy to gain a victory by wearing out the allied reserve before he has exhausted his own.

The Supreme War Council is confident of the ultimate result. The allied peoples are resolute not to sacrifice a single one of the free nations of the world to the despotism of Berlin. Their armies are displaying the same steadfast courage which has enabled them on many previous occasions to defeat the German onset. They have only to endure with faith and patience to the end to make the victory of freedom secure. The free peoples and their magnificent soldiers will save civilization.

STATEMENT RESPECTING THE POLISH, CZECHO-SLOVAK AND YUGO-SLAVIC PEOPLES

At a meeting held at Versailles on June 3 the prime ministers of the three allied countries, Great Britain, France and Italy, agreed to the following declarations:

(1) The creation of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.¹

¹ An Associated Press dispatch of August 19, 1918, stated:

"Brazil has been invited by the Allies to outline her position on the restoration

(2) The allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the secretary of state of the United States Government and desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations toward freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav peoples.

SEVENTH SESSION, JULY 2-5, 1918

The Supreme War Council has held its seventh session. It offered its earnest congratulations to the Italian army and people on their memorable defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army. In their judgment, this victory, gained at a critical period of the war, has been an invaluable contribution toward the eventual success of the allied cause.

A feature of the session was the presence during the third meeting of Sir Robert Borden, prime minister of Canada; Mr. W. M. Hughes, prime minister of Australia; Mr. W. F. Massey, prime minister of New Zealand; Mr. W. F. Lloyd, prime minister of Newfoundland, and several other ministers of the overseas Dominions of the British Empire, who were presented by Mr. Lloyd George.

On behalf of the Supreme War Council, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando tendered to these representatives the thanks of the allied nations for the very great services rendered on the battlefield during the war by the troops of the great British colonies.

The Supreme War Council considered the present situation of the war in all its aspects in conjunction with General Foch and its other military advisers, and came to important decisions in regard thereto.

Among those present during the session were M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, M. Pichon, Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Baron Sonnino, General Foch, Sir Henry Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, General Pershing, and the permanent military representatives at Versailles.

of independence to Poland as one of the conditions of peace. Nilo Pecanha, minister of foreign affairs, has stated that he would not consider any compromise on the part of the Allies on the question of Poland's freedom. Brazil has no choice of roads which may be followed in this matter, he says, having already chosen the right path."

SESSION OF OCTOBER 30—NOVEMBER 10, 1918

STATEMENT RELATIVE TO PEACE TERMS

The allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2 relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.¹

STATEMENT RELATIVE TO FEEDING CIVILIAN POPULATION

The Supreme War Council in session at Versailles desire to co-operate with Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria in the making available as far as possible food and other supplies necessary for the life of the civilian population of those countries.²

ARMISTICE WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 31,
1918, 12 M.³

One—The opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupations of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

Two—The positions of all mine fields, torpedo tubes and other ob-

¹ Official U. S. Bulletin, November 6, 1918, page 2. In the newspaper accounts this statement was identified as the 22nd resolution of the Supreme War Council.

² Official U. S. Bulletin, November 6, 1918, page 1.

³ The armistice put an end to hostilities resulting from declarations of war by or against the following: By Great Britain, November 5, 1914; by Italy, August

structions in Turkish waters are to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them, as may be required.

Three—All available information concerning mines in the Black Sea is to be communicated.

Four—All allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners are to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

Five—Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except such troops as are required for surveillance on the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. The number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.

Six—The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters, or in waters occupied by Turkey. These ships will be interned in such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

Seven—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

Eight—Free use by allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by the enemy. Similar conditions are to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for the purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.

Nine—The use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

Ten—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

Eleven—Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from northwest Persia to behind the pre-war frontier already has been ordered, and will be carried out. A part of Transcaucasia already has been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops. The remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

Twelve—Wireless, telegraph and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies. Turkish Government messages to be excepted.

21, 1915; against Rumania, August 29, 1916; holy war against Allies, November 11, 1914.

Severances of diplomatic relations were: By Belgium, October 30, 1914; by France, October 30, 1914; by Greece, July 2, 1917; by United States, April 20, 1917.

The text printed is that given out by the British Government. It differs from the text published in America particularly in that Art. 15 was not included in the cabled version. There were consequent differences in order and numbering.

Thirteen—Prohibition against the destruction of any naval, military or commercial material.

Fourteen—Facilities are to be given for the purchase of coal, oil fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above materials is to be exported.

Fifteen—Allied control officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Transcaucasian railways now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include allied occupation of Batum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

Sixteen—The surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia to the nearest allied commander, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause Six.

Seventeen—The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey agrees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

Eighteen—The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenica, including Misurata, to the nearest allied garrison.

Nineteen—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions. Those in remote districts as soon after that time as may be possible.

Twenty—Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of equipment, arms and ammunition, including the transport of that portion of the Turkish army which is demobilized under Clause Five.

Twenty-one—An allied representative to be attached to the Turkish ministry of supplies in order to safeguard allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all aid necessary for this purpose.

Twenty-two—Turkish prisoners are to be kept at the disposal of the allied powers. The release of the Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age is to be considered.

Twenty-three—An obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

Twenty-four—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

Twenty-five—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, Thursday, October 31, 1918.

ARMISTICE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 4, 1918,
3 P.M.¹

MILITARY CLAUSES

One—The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea and air.

Two—Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in Clause Three, below, there shall only be maintained as an Austro-Hungarian military force a maximum of 20 divisions reduced to pre-war effectiveness.

Half the divisional, corps and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

Three—Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war.

Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the commanders-in-chief of the allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Oetz and Zoaller. The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier of the Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis, and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou), and the watershed of the Cols di Pod-

¹ Official U. S. Bulletin, November 4, 1918. The armistice put an end to hostilities resulting from declarations of war by or against the following: Against Belgium, August 28, 1914; against Japan, August 27, 1914; against Montenegro, August 9, 1914; against Russia, August 6, 1914; against Serbia, July 28, 1914; by China, August 14, 1917; by Cuba, December 16, 1917; by France, August 12, 1914; by Great Britain, August 13, 1914; by Italy, May 24, 1915; by Nicaragua, May 6, 1918; by Panamá, December 10, 1917; by Rumania, August 27, 1916; by Siam, July 22, 1917; by United States, December 7, 1917.

Severances of diplomatic relations were: Against Portugal, March 15, 1916; by Greece, July 2, 1917.

berdo, Podlaniscam, and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast toward the Schneeberg, excludes the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries. From Schneeberg it goes down toward the coast in such a way as to include Častua, Mattuglia and Volosca in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Tridania, and to the south territory limited by a line from the coast of Cape Planca to the summits of the watershed eastward, so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water courses flowing toward Sebenico, such as the Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maon, Paga and Puntadura, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant'Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza. All territory thus evacuated shall be occupied by the forces of the Allies and of the United States of America.

Maintenance in place of all the military and railway material of the enemy found on the territory to be evacuated. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of all this material (supplies of coal and others included) according to the detailed instructions given by the commanders in chief of the associated powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the associated powers.

Four—The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and water ways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation. The armies of the associated powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the armies of the associated powers wherever they may be.

Five—Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within the date.

Six—The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be intrusted to the local authorities under the control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.

Seven—The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all allied prisoners of war and internal subjects and of civil populations evacuated from their homes, on conditions to be laid down by the commanders-in-chief of the forces of the allied powers on the various fronts.

Eight—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

NAVAL CONDITIONS

One—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marine of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Two—Surrender to the Allies and the United States of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States.

Three—Surrender to the Allies and the United States with their complete armament and equipment of three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, one mine layer, six Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America.

Four—Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of the allied and associated powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The Allies and associated powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation on the Danube, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

Five—The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the Allies and the United States of America.

Six—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America.

Seven—Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

Eight—Occupation by the Allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

Nine—All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the Allies and associated powers to be returned.

Ten—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

Eleven—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the allied and associated powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, declare approval of the above indicated conditions. November 3, 1918.

The representatives of the supreme command of the Austro-Hungarian army:

Victor Weber Edler von Wibenau
Karl Schneller
Y. von Liechtenstein
J. V. Nyekleji
Zivierkowski
Victor Freiherr von Seiller
Kamillo Ruggera

The representatives of the supreme command of the Italian army:

Pietro Badoglio
Scipione Scipioni
Tullio Marchetti
Pietro Gazzera
Pietro Maravigna
Alberto Pariani
Francesco Accinni

ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY, EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 11, 1918, 11 A.M.¹

Convention between Marshal Foch, commander-in-chief of the allied armies, acting in the name of the allied and associated powers, with Admiral Wemyss, first sea lord, on the one hand; and

Herr Erzberger, secretary of state, president of the German delegation, Count von Oberndorff, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Major-General von Winterfeldt,

Captain Vanselow (German navy),

duly empowered and acting with the concurrence of the German chancellor, on the other hand,

An armistice has been concluded under the following conditions:

A.—MILITARY CLAUSES ON WESTERN FRONT

One—Cessation of hostilities on land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two—Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as also Alsace-Lorraine, so ordered as to be completed within 15 days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note² (Appendix I) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

Three—Repatriation beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

¹ As revised by the military authorities. The armistice put an end to hostilities resulting from declarations of war by or against the following: By Brazil, October 26, 1917; by China, August 14, 1917; by Cuba, April 7, 1917; by and against France, August 3, 1914; against Belgium, August 4, 1914; by Great Britain, August 4, 1914; by Greek Provisional Government, November 23, 1916; by Greece (Government of Alexander), July 2, 1917; by Guatemala, April 21, 1918; by Haiti, July 12, 1918; by Honduras, July 19, 1918; by Italy, August 28, 1916; by Japan, August 23, 1914; by Liberia, August 4, 1917; by Nicaragua, May 6, 1918; by Panamá, April 7, 1917; by Portugal (intervention as English ally), November 23, 1914; against Portugal, March 9, 1916; by Serbia, August 6, 1914; by Siam, July 22, 1917; by United States, April 6, 1917.

Severances of diplomatic relations were: Bolivia, April 14, 1917; Ecuador, December 7, 1917; Perú, October 5, 1917; Uruguay, October 7, 1917.

² Appendix I specifies the details and times of evacuation of stated sectors and of the delivery of war material (*Holland News*, II, 2393-2394).

Four—Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: 5,000 guns (2,500 heavy and 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 *minenwerfer*, 1,700 fighting and bombing aëroplanes—primarily all the D. 7's and all the night bombing-machines. The above to be delivered *in situ* to the allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure number one) determined at the time of the signing of the armistice.

Five—Evacuation by the German armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories by allied and United States troops will be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river and 10 kilometers deep, from the Dutch frontier to the Swiss frontier. The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (left and right bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note (annexure number one) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Six—In all territories evacuated by the enemy all evacuation of inhabitants shall be forbidden; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses of participation in military measures prior to the signing of the armistice. No destruction of any kind shall be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions and equipment which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general or official character shall be taken which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

Seven—Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain so employed; 5,000 complete locomotives, 150,000 wagons

in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed in annexure number two¹ and total of which shall not exceed 31 days. There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries (camione automobiles) in good condition within 36 days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of this system. Further, working material in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent way, signals and repair shops shall be left *in situ*, and kept in an efficient state by Germany, as far as the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine are concerned. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note annexure number two regulates the details of these measures.

Eight—The German command must reveal, within 48 hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delay-action engines on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.). All under penalty of reprisals.

Nine—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten—The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial and convicted. The allied powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish. This condition annuls all previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification.² However, the repatriation of German prisoners

¹ Appendix II relates to communications. Instructions for meetings of representatives of both sides, in accordance with its Art. 1, to arrange for the extended operations of the Interallied Commission of Railways in the Field and the Interallied Commission of Navigation in the Field, and for the taking over of Belgian railroad, waterway, telephone and telegraph systems were published in the *London Times*, November 14, 1918, page 6.

² An Agreement between the British and German Governments concerning combatant Prisoners of War and Civilians (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office). Miscellaneous No. 20 (1918), Cd. 9147.

of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

Eleven—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces shall be cared for by German personnel, who will be left on the spot with the necessary material required.

B.—DISPOSITION RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

Twelve—All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in the territory which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to these frontiers of Germany, as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, account being taken of the internal situation of these territories.

Thirteen—Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents now on the territory of Russian frontiers as existing on August 1, 1914, to be recalled.

Fourteen—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measure with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

Fifteen—Denunciation of the treaties of Bukharest and Brest-Litovsk, and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

C.—EAST AFRICA

Seventeen—Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

D.—GENERAL CLAUSES

Eighteen—Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed of all interned civilians including hostages and persons under trial and convicted, who may be subjects of other allied or associated states other than those enumerated in Art. Three.

Financial Clauses

Nineteen—With the exception of any future concessions and claims by the Allies and United States of America: Repair of damage done.

While the armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be held in trust by the Allies until the signature of peace.

E.—NAVAL CONDITIONS

Twenty—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers, without raising questions of neutrality.

Twenty-one—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied and associated powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two—The surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States of all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and minelayers), with armament and equipment complete. Those which cannot put to sea shall be denuded of crew and equipment and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States.

Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designed for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of 14 days after the signing of the armistice.

Twenty-three—German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States, shall be immediately dismantled and thereafter interned in neutral ports or, in default of them, in allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. They shall there remain under the surveillance of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board. The following warships are designated

by the Allies: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers (including two mine layers), 50 destroyers of the most modern types. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States and are to be completely dismantled and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The military equipment of all vessels of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore. All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage shall be given by wireless.

Twenty-four—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and to destroy obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and associated powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Kattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up and destroy all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters, the positions of all such mines and obstructions to be indicated by Germany, who shall be permitted to raise no question of neutrality.

Twenty-six—The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

Twenty-seven—All aerial forces are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight—In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports Germany shall abandon *in situ* and intact all port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind.

Twenty-nine—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and

other material of all kinds seized in those ports are to be handed over and German materials as specified in Art. Twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty—All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the allied and associated powers are to be restored to ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, delivery or restoration.

Thirty-two—The German Government shall formally notify all the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the allied and associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for special concessions, such as the export of ship-building materials, or not, are immediately canceled.

Thirty-three—No transfer of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag is to take place after signature of the armistice.

F.—DURATION OF ARMISTICE

Thirty-four—The duration of the armistice is to be 36 days with option to extend. During this period, if its clauses are not carried into execution, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, which must give warning 48 hours in advance. It is understood that the execution of Arts. Three and Eighteen shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is recognized. This commission¹ will act under the supreme authority of the high command, military and naval, of the allied armies.

The present armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, at 5 o'clock, A.M., French time. F. Foch, R. E. Wemyss, Erzberger, A. Oberndorff, Winterfeldt, Vanselow.

¹The commission met first at Spa.

APPENDIX.

I. ANNOUNCEMENT OF AMERICAN MISSION TO EUROPE, NOVEMBER 8, 1917¹

The Government of the United States will participate in the approaching conference of the powers waging war against the German Empire and has sent as its representative Edward M. House, who is accompanied by Admiral William S. Benson, chief of naval operations; General Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff, United States Army; Oscar T. Crosby, assistant secretary of the Treasury; Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; Bainbridge Colby, United States Shipping Board; Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor, representing the Food Controller; Thomas Nelson Perkins, representing the Priority Board; and Gordon Auchincloss, as secretary.

The conference is essentially a "war conference," with the object of perfecting a more complete co-ordination of the activities of the various nations engaged in the conflict and a more comprehensive understanding of their respective needs in order that the joint efforts of the co-belligerents may attain the highest war efficiency. While a definite program has not been adopted, it may be assumed that the subjects to be discussed will embrace not only those pertaining to military and naval operations, but also the financial, commercial, economic, and other phases of the present situation which are of vital importance to the successful prosecution of the war.

There will undoubtedly be an effort to avoid any conflict of interests among the participants; and there is every reason to anticipate that the result will be a fuller co-operation, and consequently a much higher efficiency, and a more vigorous prosecution of the war.

The United States in the employment of its man power and material resources desires to use them to the greatest advantage against Germany. It has been no easy problem to determine how they can be used most effectively since the independent presentation of requirements by the allied Governments have been more or less conflicting on account of

¹Official Bulletin, November 8, 1917.

each Government's appreciation of its own wants, which are naturally given greater importance than the wants of other Governments. By a general survey of the whole situation and a free discussion of the needs of all the approaching conference will undoubtedly be able to give to the demands of the several Governments their true perspective and proper place in the general plan for the conduct of the war.

Though the resources of this country are vast and though there is every purpose to devote them all, if need be, to winning the war, they are not without limit. But even if they were greater, they should be used to the highest advantage in attaining the supreme object for which we are fighting. This can only be done by a full and frank discussion of the plans and needs of the various belligerents. It is the earnest wish of this Government to employ its military and naval forces and its resources and energies where they will give the greatest returns in advancing the common cause. The exchange of views which will take place at the conference and the conclusions which will be reached will be of the highest value in preventing waste of energy and in bringing into harmony the activities of the nations which have been unavoidably acting in a measure independently.

In looking forward to the assembling of the conference it can not be too strongly emphasized that it is a war conference and nothing else, devoted to devising ways and means to intensify the efforts of the belligerents against Germany by complete co-operation under a general plan, and thus bring the conflict to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.

II. STATEMENT OF PAUL PAINLEVÉ, PREMIER, IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER 13, 1917

The grave events which have taken place in the last few weeks impose on the Government the duty of submitting this declaration to both Chambers.

On the one hand, the extremists in Petrograd have temporarily made themselves masters of the city, and although the latest news gives ground for thinking that the provisional Government has been able to re-establish its authority, the effects of such a shock will continue to be felt for some time.

On the other hand, the relative freedom which the Russian armies are leaving to the German armies on the eastern front is allowing the latter to detach a certain number of divisions against Italy. The Italian northeastern front has been broken in in circumstances which remain

obscure. The second Italian army, which some weeks earlier gained a brilliant victory on the Bainsizza plateau, has suffered considerable losses in a grievous retreat, and Venetia has been opened to invasion. This grave and unexpected situation called for immediate measures.

At the very earliest moment and without awaiting any appeal, French troops hurried up and took their place upon the Italian front with a precision and rapidity which filled all those who had the opportunity of witnessing it with admiration. To-day it is the British contingents that are spreading out beyond the Alps. The measures taken cannot be better summed up than in the statement that from the very first moment when the gravity of the situation became manifest not a moment was lost.

It was a fresh opportunity for the stout-heartedness and clear judgment of the nations to display themselves. Neither at the front nor at the rear was a word of recrimination raised because France, herself still invaded, was sending thousands of her children beyond the Alps. Everyone understood that in acting thus she was not only fulfilling loyally and spiritedly her duties as an Ally, but that, by giving her soldiers to fight in those parts of Italy where every name recalls some glorious victory, she was defending the outposts of her own frontiers.

Such events emphasize better than any theoretical reasoning the magnitude of the duties faced by the nations whose armies have charge of the vast western front, stretching from the North Sea to the Adriatic. They can fulfil their immense task only by close union in their plans, by a thorough inter-connection between their armies, by the pooling and harmonious adjustment of all their resources. The Government program which Parliament approved two months ago declared, in speaking of the country's Allies:

“Combatants of yesterday or to-day, drawn together by the same sacred cause, they must act as if they constituted a single nation, a single army, a single front. Since the defeat of any one of them would be the defeat of all, and since victory would be the victory of all, they should put their men, their armies, and their money into a common stock.”¹

That program we have from the outset done our utmost to realize. To it we have devoted all our efforts; for on its realization victory depends. These last few weeks have only made our duty more urgent.

And now I come to the results we have obtained. In order to realize unity of military action, Great Britain, France and Italy have agreed on the establishment of an interallied committee, which will be known as the Supreme War Council [*Conseil supérieure de guerre*]. We have no

¹ *Journal officiel. Chambre des députés.* September 18, 1917, 2323.

doubt that the United States, whose troops are called to fight upon the same front, will give this council its adhesion. As regards the other fronts, further negotiations will be conducted with Russia and Japan.

PURPOSE OF THE COUNCIL

The purpose of the council is not to direct military operations in detail but to shape the general policy of the war and the general plans of the Allies by adapting them to the resources and means available in such manner as to insure those means yielding the best results. It is to comprise two representatives of each Government and to meet normally in France at least once a month. It will rely upon the permanent inter-allied general staff, which will be both its central intelligence organ and its technical adviser. The decisions of such a council can have no tinge of particularism. They will embrace the field of battle as a whole. They will be subject to ratification by the respective Governments, and already we hear the objection: "What we want is a single command, and not a consultative committee."

No plan escapes criticism, and I am far from saying that ours constitutes the last step in the line of the progress that has to be made, but in such matters the wisest course is to realize immediately what is possible without making the attainment of the best an excuse for waiting for months without achieving anything.

If unity of command is one day possible, and is really efficacious, its exercise will require just such an interallied general staff as has now been created. Perhaps even the working of the Supreme War Council will lead to the institution of that unity of command without its being so called, which is better than having the word without having the thing.

In fact, the creation of this Supreme War Council is regarded by the British and Italian Governments as an immense step forward, which others may follow. The language of their whole press shows that the Italians have derived from this new creation a big source of comfort and enthusiasm, while the judgment of the British may be summed up in Mr. Lloyd George's dictum: "The war has been prolonged by sectionalism; it will be shortened by solidarity."

Another problem in the military domain which urgently calls for the attention of Parliament is that of the extension of the British front.

A preliminary agreement has just been reached between the two commanders-in-chief, with the authority of the two Governments, and

will be carried out at a very early date which it would be inadvisable to specify.

Besides this, the victory on the Aisne, one of the most brilliant of this war, by its rectification of our front and its improvement of our positions places some divisions at our disposal.

But every one in this house understands that at such a time and in the face of the military developments now taking place there can be no question of removing fresh classes from the front.

Germany is attempting a desperate effort with all her available forces to obtain before the end of the year a showy victory, which she might hope would be decisive. This supreme effort of the enemy must be met by a supreme effort on the part of France and her Allies without abandoning a scrap of our military strength.

COMMON FOOD SUPPLIES

But it is not only in the military domain; it is in every domain, and in particular in the economic domain, that the Government has endeavored to realize a systematic co-ordination and complete solidarity with our Allies. The negotiations which we have just been conducting with the British Government aimed at assuring a full and regular co-operation between the two Governments for the provisioning of both countries, as well as of Italy and of our European Allies. Great Britain and France have arrived at a complete agreement, which will be put into execution at once. In virtue of this agreement, the allied countries will in future constitute but a single country from the point of view of food supplies and imports indispensable to their existence.

Great Britain has never hesitated before the division of resources, which she regards as one of the essential duties of the alliance, but hitherto the measures taken have been provisional measures for immediate aid. The agreement arrived at for the future replaces such immediate aid, given to meet an imminent danger, by the common execution of a concerted program, thanks to which, provided we discipline ourselves and are ready to impose upon ourselves the same sacrifices and restrictions as our Ally is going to impose upon herself, all fear of a crisis suddenly yawning before us will be averted in advance. The country must make up its mind that these restrictions are indispensable if the necessary tonnage is to be freed for the transport of American troops in great numbers.

The collaboration of the Government of the United States is indispensable to the development of this policy of co-operation, which is imposed

by events. Everybody knows the daily efforts of the federal Government, under the direction of President Wilson, to bring to the Allies and especially to France not only the military but the economic aid of the great American nation. We are certain that the next interallied conference, to which America has specially delegated Colonel House as its eminent representative, will contribute to the final realization of unity of action in the economic and financial fields.¹ . . .

III. DIPLOMATIC UNITY OF ACTION

At a conference held in Paris March 27-28, 1916, the representatives of the allied Governments affirmed "the entire community of views and solidarity of the Allies," by which they meant, besides military and diplomatic unity, "diplomatic unity of action, which is guaranteed by their unshakable determination to pursue the struggle to the victory of their common cause."

An editorial in the *London Times*, September 20, 1918, suggested the creation of a diplomatic council—"a sort of political Versailles"—to give unity of political command under the Supreme War Council. This suggestion drew forth discussion. The writer signing himself "Pertinax" in the *Echo de Paris* said:

"A Government can pool its armies, ships, economic resources and so on. It cannot altogether alienate its freedom of judgment, cannot withdraw from the daily changing influence of public opinion. Do what one may, there are certain decisions which will never be taken at Versailles. To ignore this would be to defeat the end in view. The innovation should be confined to:

"1. More frequent meetings between allied ministers.

"2. The participation by American plenipotentiaries in these meetings, a measure which Mr. Wilson has hitherto declined to take.

"3. The creation of offices for the centralization of all information received by the various Governments concerning current events, thus assuring that, if the decisions are not everywhere

¹ Translated from *Journal officiel, Chambre des députés. Séance du 13 Novembre 1917, 2940-2942; ibid., Sénat, 978-979.*

identical, at any rate the problems shall be formulated everywhere in identical terms.

“4. The creation of ‘small executives’ for the application in a strictly defined field—for instance, in the field of Russian affairs—of decisions taken in common.”

The *Temps* was of the opinion that the best means would be that which has succeeded so well in securing military unity—namely, an interallied organ of information, studies and preparation. *Le Pays* thought that if an organ of diplomatic unity were already in existence, the Allies might have sent a collective reply to the Austrian proposal.

The Italian *Corriere della Sera* of Milan remarked that the privileged position of the United States, which is not bound by special agreement with the other powers of the Entente, permitted Mr. Wilson to dictate a reply to Austria before the Entente leaders had time to meet. The paper added that unfortunately before creating a diplomatic Versailles the Entente Governments were obliged to determine the big lines of a common Entente policy, and have not yet been able to seek a solution of problems which ought to have been solved at the beginning of the war.”

This discussion had not resulted in any definite action up to mid-October. Political decisions of the Supreme War Council must take into consideration the terms of the following engagements:

I. DECLARATION BY WHICH GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN AND
RUSSIA ENGAGE NOT TO CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE
PRESENT WAR¹

The Italian Government having decided to accede to the Declaration between the British, French and Russian Governments, signed at London on the 5th September, 1914, which Declaration was acceded to by the Japanese Government on the 19th October, 1915,² the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:

¹Treaty Series No. 14 (1915).

²Treaty Series No. 9 (1915).

The British, French, Italian, Japanese and Russian¹ Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war.

The five Governments agree that, when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quintuplicate, this 30th day of November, 1915.

(L.S.) E. GREY.
 (L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.
 (L.S.) IMPERIALI.
 (L.S.) K. INOUYÉ.
 (L.S.) BENCKENDORF.

2. DECLARATION OF THE ALLIED GUARANTEEING POWERS TO BELGIUM, HAVRE, FEBRUARY 14, 1916²

a. MINISTERS OF FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The allied powers signatory to the treaties guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium have decided to renew to-day by solemn act the agreements made regarding your country, which has been heroically faithful to its international obligations. Consequently we, the ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia, duly authorized by our Governments, have the honor to make the following declaration:

“The allied and guaranteeing powers declare that when the moment comes the Belgian Government will be called upon to take part in peace negotiations, they will not put an end to hostilities without Belgium having re-established its political and economic independence.”³

¹ Russia was still an allied state for the purposes of the war, said the British secretary of state for foreign affairs in reply to a question in Parliament on January 21, 1918. He added that the position taken up by Russia at the present time with reference to the pact of London did not affect the validity of the treaties so far as he knew. (*London Times*, January 22, 1918, page 10.)

² *New York Times*, February 17, 1916.

³ The Italian minister, although Italy was not among the powers which guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium, stated that his Government had no objections to the foregoing declaration. A similar announcement was made on behalf of the Japanese Government.

b. BARON BEYENS, BELGIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE MINISTERS OF THE ALLIES

The Government of the King is profoundly grateful to the Governments of the three powers guaranteeing the independence of Belgium of which you are representatives for their generous initiative in making known to-day this declaration. I thank you heartily in its behalf. Your words will have a vibrating echo in the hearts of Belgians, whether they are fighting at the front, suffering in their occupied country, or awaiting in exile—and all with the same courage—the hour of deliverance. The new assurance which you have just given will confirm their unshakeable conviction that Belgium will be restored from its ruins and re-established in its complete political and economic independence.

I am certain that I express their sentiments in telling you that you must have complete confidence in us, as we have confidence in our loyal guarantors, for we are all resolved to continue the struggle energetically with them until the triumph of the right, for defense of which we sacrificed ourselves after the unjustifiable violation of our beloved country.

3. STATEMENT OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL RESPECTING THE POLISH, CZECHO-SLOVAK AND YUGO-SLAVIC PEOPLES

This statement is printed above, pages 386-387.

4. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND THE MURMAN COUNCIL ¹

The General Assembly of the Murman Regional Council has sanctioned without opposition the following agreement, which is temporary in character and made necessary by special circumstances, between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France, and the Presidium of the Murman Regional Council:

Item 1. The present agreement, which has to be sanctioned by the Governments of the Allies, is concluded between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, on the one side, and the representatives of the Murman Regional Council, on the other side, with the object of securing co-ordinated action on the part of those who have signed this agreement, for the defense of the Murman region against the powers of the German coalition. For the purpose of obtaining this aim both the signing parties take upon themselves the obligation to support each other mutually.

¹ London *Times*, July 24, 1918, page 6.

Item 2. The Murman region is composed of the former Alexandrovsk district of the province of Archangel.

Item 3. All detachments of Russian armed forces of the Murman region, alike those which already exist and those which will be formed, will be under the direction of the Russian military command appointed by the Murman Regional Council. (Remark.—It is recognized as very desirable that an independent Russian army should be created, but with the object of obtaining more speedily the principal aim of this agreement the admission of Russian volunteers into the allied forces is permitted. In the case of such admissions it is to be taken as recognized that of these volunteers no independent Russian detachments shall be formed, but that, as far as circumstances permit, the detachments should be composed only of an equal number of foreigners and Russians.)

Item 4. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France will give to the Russian command necessary help in equipment, supplies and transports and for the instruction of the Russian armed forces which are formed.

Item 5. The whole authority in the internal administration of the region belongs without qualification to the Murman Regional Council.

Item 6. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France and their agents will not interfere in the home affairs of the region. In all matters in which it may be found necessary to have the support of the local population, the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France and their agents will address themselves to the respective Russian authorities and not directly to the population, excepting in the belt along the front in which the orders of the military command, justified by the conditions of field service, must be obeyed unconditionally by all. The Murman region will be determined by the Murman Regional Council, which will take into consideration the state of war in which the region is involved and the necessity for most energetic precaution against espionage. Salaries and the standard of labor productivity will be established by the Murman Regional Council.

Item 7. In view of the impossibility of importing the necessary food from Russia the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France promise, as far as it shall be possible, to secure food to the Murman Regional Council for the whole population of the region, including all immigrant workmen with their families, the

rations to equal in food value the rations which the privates of the allied armed forces in Murman are receiving.

Item 8. The distribution of food among the population is to be carried out by trustworthy Russian troops.

Item 9. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France promise to secure, as far as may be possible, the importation of manufactured goods and other articles of the first necessity.

Item 10. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France promise as far as it may be possible to secure to the Murman Regional Council all necessary materials and implements for technical equipment and supplies so that it may carry out its program of construction which has been elaborated by mutual agreement. In this agreement, first, the requirements of war-time are taken into consideration; secondly, the development of international trade intercourse; and, thirdly, the local fisheries.

Item 11. All expenses which may be incurred by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France as the result of this agreement are to be set down to the account of the respective Powers.

Item 12. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France recognize that their Governments must give the necessary financial assistance to the Murman Regional Council.

Item 13. The present agreement comes into force from the moment of its ratification¹ by the Murman Regional Council and will remain in force as long as normal relations between the Russian central authority on the one side and the Murman Regional Council and the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France on the other side, are not re-established.

Item 14. Before signing this agreement the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France, in the name of their Governments, again affirm the absence of any purpose of conquest in respect to the Murman region as a whole or in regard to any of its parts. The Presidium of the Murman Regional Council, before the Russian people and the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America and France, declares that the only object of this agreement is to guard the integrity of the Murman Region for a Great United Russia.

¹The agreement was sanctioned by the Murman Regional Council on July 7.

The original of this agreement has been signed by the Presidium of the Murman Regional Council and by the representatives of the above-named Powers.

5. DECISIONS RESPECTING JOINT ACTION IN SIBERIA

a. DECLARATION OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, AUGUST 2, 1918

The Japanese Government, actuated by sentiments of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, have always entertained the most sanguine hopes of the speedy re-establishment of order in Russia and of the healthy, untrammelled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the central European empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenseless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country, and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian Far Eastern possessions.

They have persistently interfered with the passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume the position of command. The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race, and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern.

In the presence of the danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events, and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok.

The Government of the United States, equally sensible to the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for the early dispatch of troops to relieve the pressure weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government, have decided to proceed at once to make disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok.

In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and

of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects here indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from the Russian territories, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.

*b. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AUGUST 4, 1918*¹

In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distresses.

Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and

¹ Official Bulletin, August 4, 1918.

Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks; and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary

or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.


6. INTERNATIONAL COUNCILS IN RUSSIA

In order to co-ordinate the efforts of the Allies and the United States in Russia, an American official dispatch from France on August 22, 1918, announced the decision to create two international councils, one at Archangel, including the Entente ambassadors under the presidency of American Ambassador Francis, and the other at Vladivostok, to be composed of five high officials.

On the Vladivostok council Great Britain is represented by Sir Charles Norton Edgcombe Eliot; France by Eugène Regnault, former ambassador to Japan; and Japan by Mr. Matsudaira. An American representative had not been named, but Mr. Caldwell, the American consul, was serving.

Ambassador Francis presides over the work of the Archangel commission as dean of the diplomatic corps there.

These councils, it is understood, act as diplomatic representatives in dealing with the independent Russian Government in Siberia and on the Murman coast and pave the way for the great economic and industrial commissions organizing to aid in the rehabilitation of Russia. The councils relieve the military leaders operating from Vladivostok and in the Archangel territory of all nonmilitary work. Their first task was to aid in the re-establishment of civil government in regions entirely disorganized as a result of Bolshevism.



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